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## **NATO** **North Atlantic Council** **Topic Area B**

*The installation of antimissile system in member-states of the European  
Union and member-states of NATO.*



**UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA**  
**THESSALONIKI, GREECE**

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## Introduction

The United States is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic on the deployment of American missile defence (MD) assets on their territories to defend the United States against the threat of long-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. The system would also provide protection to the majority of European states. Specifically in April 2007, the representatives of U.S.A., Czech Republic and Poland presented to the other member states of NATO their propositions concerning the installation of specific elements of the American system of antimissile defence in the Eastern Europe. The defence systems being proposed are a radar site in the Brdy district near the village of Misov in the Czech Republic and a 275 hectare base for ten ground-based missile interceptors near Koszalin in Poland. Construction could begin in 2008 and the system could be operational by 2011. About 350 personnel would operate the facilities.

It is the first time in history that the American defence system will protect the territory of the U.S.A. and the majority of the European states in case of a missile attack planed by Iran and North Korea. One of the strongest arguments of USA is that the placement of anti-missile sites in Eastern Europe could prevent a war with Iran by building an effective deterrent. However, this potential deployment has caused a high-profile debate about the feasibility and desirability of missile defences in Europe and in particular within the member – states of the European Union. The antimissile system has also faced objections from the Russian government. After a special meeting of high-level representatives of NATO countries at NATO's Headquarters on 19 April 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that "the unanimous view was that the principle of the indivisibility of security should apply. There is a shared desire that any US system should be complementary to any NATO missile defence system."



## NATO and Missile Defence

In 1999 the Strategic Concept of NATO recognizes the need for missile defence to counter nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) threats. In May 2001, NATO launched two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance TMD system. The studies were conducted by teams led by Lockheed-Martin Missiles and Fire Control and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The launch of the TMD program is the result of a decade work by NATO in the theatre missile defence area and provided to the Allies a new collective capability. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO initiated a NATO Missile Defence Feasibility Study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

In September 2006 NATO selected an international consortium led by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to build an Integration Test Bed for the Alliance's future Active Layered Theatre Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. In November 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Allied leaders tasked continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance, including an update on missile threat developments.

NATO is conducting three missile-defence related activities:

- a) **The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme (ALTBMD):** a programme that protects deployed forces within or outside NATO territory, against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (usually taken to mean with a range of up to 3,000km). It will also have a capability against aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other aerial threats. This will be a NATO-funded command and control deployment programme which will integrate sensors and interceptors provided by member nations, such as American and multi-national systems of various capabilities. The ALTBMD is scheduled to become partly operational by 2010 (possibly protecting the NATO Response Force) and fully operational by 2016.



- b) **The Missile Defence for the protection of NATO territory:** Specifically this Missile Defence Feasibility Study examined the options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. This study was executed by a transatlantic multinational industry team in cooperation with NATO and was approved by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in April 2006. The study concluded missile defence of NATO territory is technically feasible "within the limitations and assumptions of the study".
- c) **Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) cooperation with Russia:** is within the context of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) where the TMD Ad-Hoc working Group is focusing on the creation of "the conditions for NATO and Russia to conduct joint TMD operations". The "Third Site" has also been discussed within the context of the NRC.

Negotiations between the United States and Poland and the Czech Republic on the deployment of elements of the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defence system have been conducted strictly bilaterally, and not in the NATO context. However, the issue has been discussed at NATO Headquarters through extensive ongoing consultations; this included briefings by senior US Defence Department officials and the head of the US Missile Defence Agency to the North Atlantic Council in April 2007. It was also discussed during the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo on 26-27 April and the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels, 14 June. It was agreed to assess by February 2008 the political and military implications for NATO of the planned US missile defence system elements in Europe. In particular, the assessment will focus on the possibility of merging NATO's ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme) into the US system in order to ensure that all of Alliance territory would be covered from missile threats.

The United States has suggested that the long-range interceptors it plans to base in Europe could be complementary to NATO's efforts to counter shorter-range threats. NATO's ALTBMD could provide a shield for the South-Eastern European Allies, although the original purpose of ALTBMD was to protect deployed troops. The United States has also suggested that its systems in Europe would be able to link to NATO systems, although making clear that it would retain command and control over American assets. All in all, important decisions and actions should



be made in order to deepen NATO's political role and engagement in the world and modernize the Alliance's capability to promote stability wherever necessary.

### **What is defined as "the threat"?**

According to the US Missile Defence Agency (US MDA) there were about 100 non-US ballistic missile launches around the world in 2006 - twice that of the previous year. This trend reflects the determination and effort of many countries to acquire ballistic missile capabilities. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently declared that "there is absolutely a shared threat perception between the Allies. Allies all agree that there is a threat from ballistic missiles".

The concerns of the United States about missile launches are focused on Iran or North Korea, although neither has yet achieved confirmed long-range ballistic missile capabilities. Iran currently possesses a medium-range missile (the Shahab-3) which could reach Turkey, Israel, and much of the Middle East as well as Afghanistan. Reports suggest that Iran is developing more advanced Shahab missiles with longer ranges - which would pose a threat to Europe - and American intelligence estimates are that Iran could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015. Tehran has acknowledged that it is pursuing a space-launch capability, and while this capability is said to be for peaceful purposes, it could be potentially used to deliver payloads over intercontinental ranges.

### **What has been proposed?**

The United States is developing a multi-layered missile defence system to protect itself from ballistic missiles with different ranges. In order to counter short-range missiles, the US Patriot interceptors, mounted on mobile platforms, have already been in operation for two decades and proved their worth on the battlefield. The more recent sea-based Aegis and road-



mobile THAAD systems are designed to provide the defence against medium-range missiles. The shield against short- and medium-range missiles usually covers specific objectives and limited areas (or theatres) and is therefore often referred to as Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

The US shield against long-range missiles (also known as Ground-based Midcourse Defence - GMD) is only partially installed: two sets of missile interceptors in Alaska and California are already operational, and are intended to defend against missiles launched from North Korea. Nevertheless, the US remains vulnerable to the potential long-range missile threat stemming from potential enemies in the Middle East. The proposed "Third Site" in Central Europe is intended to close this gap.

The US Missile Defence Agency also intends to deploy a forward-based radar for early warning and detection. This mobile radar will be placed closer to the threat from Iran. Other elements of the overall system already exist outside the United States: early warning radars in Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, UK, were constructed during the Cold War to track any US-bound Soviet missiles, and are currently being upgraded. The US missile defence system also uses radars based high in space (in the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, approximately 36,000 km above the earth), but these infrared satellites can only detect ballistic missiles in the boost phase when they emit large volumes of heat. Currently there are no alternatives to ground- or sea-based radars in order to track missiles in the midcourse of their flight, however, the US has plans to introduce a new generation of space-based radars, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which will be able to track missiles even when they drop their boost rockets and cool down.

The US missile defence is unique as it is the only system in the world that aims to intercept long-range missiles in the midcourse of their flight, i.e., in space. All other existing systems (Russian, Chinese, Israeli or European) can only target missiles that are already descending. The terminal-phase interception is not believed to be effective against intercontinental missiles that would be travelling at extremely high velocities. The US interceptors are also based on kinetic kill technology, aiming to destroy incoming missiles by physically colliding with them, instead of using explosive warheads.



## **Location and Coverage of proposed interceptors**

In the process of deciding where to locate interceptors, several key factors must be taken into consideration. Early interception is also an advantage. However, it is clearly not possible to place interceptors very close to the launch area (in Turkey, for instance, as sometimes suggested), and there are technical challenges - such as very short warning times - in doing so. Placing interceptors in Turkey would imply that the US seeks to intercept Iranian missiles in the boost-phase of their flight, but such interception technology does not exist yet.

Thus, there are clear technical reasons why the United States is seeking its proposed "Third Site" in Central Europe. These considerations also explain why the United States is having discussions with the United Kingdom on potentially deploying interceptors there. However, according to the US MDA, deploying interceptors in the UK would cause an even more negative reaction from Moscow as these interceptors would have a theoretical capability to catch US-bound Russian ICBMs. Other countries, including Ukraine, have also expressed some interest in participating in the system.

The U.S.A. maintains that the system would not only protect the United States but also many of its European allies against long-range ballistic missile threats from "rogue countries" like Iran. However, the proximity to the Middle East of some NATO allies in Southeast Europe means that they face a more immediate threat from shorter-range missiles. Protecting these regions would require a system more like the Patriot terminal phase defence missile that was used to protect Israel from Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War.

## **Technical Limitations of the proposed system**

There is a debate about the effectiveness of the proposed missile defence system and the rigour of its testing programme. The US MDA claims that the majority of the tests have been successful, but some experts express concern that the test conditions were not realistic.



However, future tests will be conducted under more complex conditions. Another criticism is that cruise missiles, low-flying aircraft, or even a smuggled nuclear weapon could affect the efficiency of the system.

These same arguments have raged around missile defence for decades, and despite the supposed simplicity of alternative means of delivery, countries still seek ever more capable ballistic missiles. However, there are exaggerated concerns about debris raining down on Europe. The interception would take place high above the atmosphere (at an altitude of more than 200 km) and most if not all the resulting debris would burn up as it re-entered the atmosphere.

### Cost Considerations

The United States has spent US\$110 billion on missile defence projects since the mid-80s and the current budget for the Missile Defence Agency (MDA), which is responsible for all US missile defence programmes, is about US\$9 billion per year. The cost of construction of the "Third Site" is estimated to be at least at US\$3.5 billion.

It is estimated that rendering the "Third Site" interoperable with a NATO theatre missile defence system would cost about US\$1 billion spread over 20 years, i.e., approximately €50 million a year, to be shared by 26 nations. Were NATO to deploy its own comprehensive shield against missiles of all ranges, the cost would be approximately €20 billion.

### The Reaction of the European Union

The proposed deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland have aroused a debate between Alliance members. While there is consensus on the nature of the threats posed by short- and medium range missiles, opinions are divided on the immediacy of a threat from longer-range systems. There are also concerns about public reactions, the negative impact the project could



have on relations with Russia, and even the prospect of creating a new arms race. In reaction to the conflict between the US and Russia, the EU powers have to face the dilemma which countries were ready to side with USA.

The initial reaction of several Alliance leaders was to suggest that the US plan should be discussed within NATO. However, up until now, all discussions over the stationing of the weapons system between the US, the Czech Republic and Poland have taken place outside of NATO. Most European politicians have reacted by stating that the missile system should be coordinated to the responsibility of NATO—a step that the US has so far rejected. Specifically, the US has obliged with briefings to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) while insisting, however, that it is a national programme. US officials have confirmed that the system could provide coverage of most of Europe against long-range missile threats originating in the Middle East. As noted earlier, by no means all of "NATO-Europe" would be protected.

This has led the Secretary General to emphasize the principle of the indivisibility of security. He has commented that although NATO will not interfere in the bilateral discussions, he intends to ensure that there are no "A grade" and "B grade" allies when it comes to security.

European attempts to integrate the American plans into the mechanism of NATO are aimed at preventing any further divisions in Europe. In addition, the European powers are very concerned that a US defence system set up on Moscow's doorstep could poison the relationship with Russia, with consequences for the supply of Russian raw materials, including oil and gas, to a number of European countries.

Most European politicians are opposed to the US plans. The German and French governments are hesitant to take an open stand against the US, after their response to the current US plans for war against Iran. Especially Germany expressed a cautious criticism of the US antimissile plans and aims to avoid a bad influence on the EU-Russia relations. In addition, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn, expressed his hope that the European Union would be able to persuade Poland and the Czech Republic not to establish the bases. "We will not have stability in Europe," Asselborn warned, "if we force the Russians into a corner."

Other European states have declared their support for the project—in particular, those eastern European states that participated in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Recently, the



Slovak government in Bratislava, led by Prime Minister Robert Fico agreed to the setting up of a US radar and missile defence system in Slovakia. This option is being held open by US representatives in the event that problems arise in the negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic. The United Kingdom, which is also currently taking part in discussions with the US over participation in the defence system, has also welcomed the project.

Most Members of the European Parliament have agreed on the need to have more time and more debates before taking any action on the US plans to place anti-missile interceptors in Poland, and a radar system in the Czech Republic. Bilateral negotiations between Poland or the Czech Republic and the USA should be replaced by a decision taken under the NATO umbrella. The European Member States should stress their need for more time and further debates in order to reach agreement on whether or not Europe needs an anti-missile defence shield. "Poland and the Czech Republic should not take a final decision before there is a common position taken by NATO, and this implies as well longer discussions with Russia", said German MEP Karl Von Wogau, chairman of the EP's subcommittee on Security and Defence. The aim of the European Union is to achieve unanimity if possible on this issue as this will let the Union be a decisive external actor. All in all, the EU needs to respond to modern challenges of international security as one body and to safeguard interests common to all Member States.

Within the European countries that are directly involved - the Czech Republic and Poland - there are differing views on the political implications of the "Third Site". First of all, Poland and the Czech Republic are close allies of the US and belong to the "coalition of the willing," which supported the US in its invasion and occupation of Iraq. At present, Poland has 900 soldiers stationed in Iraq, and the Czech Republic 100. Both nations are currently increasing their commitment in Afghanistan in order to relieve US troops in the country. Poland has recently sent an additional 1,000 troops, and the Czech Republic is currently preparing to supply helicopters and weapons for the occupation troops. As is the case with regard to participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority of the population in both countries also rejects the planned stationing of the anti-missile defence system.

Czech and Polish politicians are also divided on this issue. The delegation of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited the Czech Republic on 27 June 2007 for a fact-finding mission



and to discuss the views of the Czech government and parliamentary representatives on the missile defence plan. Unfortunately, the delegation did not have an opportunity to visit Poland before the preparation of this report. The NATO PA delegation realised that the Czech government is determined to proceed with the plan, which is a mean of strengthening the country's security and renovating transatlantic relations in general. However, the left wing opposition in Czech Republic calls for a national referendum on this matter. Nevertheless, both sides agree that including the "Third Site" into a comprehensive NATO missile defence architecture would be a preferable and more acceptable solution to the Czech people. The NATO PA delegation also had the impression that the Czech government is generally supporting the 'NATO-isation' of the "Third Site", while the Polish side, for example, seems to favour the bilateral approach.

However, public opinion in both countries seems unconvinced. Surveys show that the majority of Poles and Czechs currently oppose to the construction of the "Third Site". Currently, approximately 60% of Czechs oppose the plan, but negative attitudes have been declining in recent months. The Czech legislators whom the NATO PA delegation met in June hoped that by the end of the year (when the US-Czech negotiations are expected to be concluded), the number of opponents would drop to less than 50%. Similar polls give figures of between 60 and 80 percent of Poles who are also opposed to the stationing of US missiles on their soil.

Due to safety and health reasons, the opposition from people living near the proposed locations of the "Third Site" is very vocal: for example, in a local referendum, and 71 of the 72 citizens of the village of Trokavec in the Czech Republic, which is being considered as a site for the radar facility, voted against the plan. The NATO PA delegation visited Trokavec and met the mayor Mr. Neoral. He said that the public needs more reliable information about the radar and its safety. The lack of such information gives ground for all kinds of myths and misconceptions. It remains to be seen how such considerations would affect debates in the parliaments of both countries, which will have to approve agreements on the basing of American interceptors and personnel.



## Russia's Reaction

While the 26 NATO Allies believe that these US plans can in no way upset the strategic balance in Europe, on the contrary Russia has expressed fundamental concerns. Specifically Russia has the divergent perspective that Europe, Russia and the United States were not targets for missile attacks from Iran. The current missiles that belong to Iran are unable to travel the required distances and when they could follow improvements to launching techniques they were unable to carry the load required for a nuclear warhead. According to Russia the status and prospective of Iranian missile potential “are not so persuasive as to the need to deploy global missile defence sites in Europe.” In addition, the Kremlin believes that neither Iran, which has not carried out a nuclear detonation test, nor North Korea, whose nuclear weapons capability is very crude, are credible targets for such a vast and complicated defensive system.

The Kremlin is aware of the threat posed to it by the accelerating nuclear arms race being pushed by the US. The incentives of the American focus in Eastern Europe is the development of a network of military facilities capable of furthering the domination of the US over Eurasia and its vast resources of energy, minerals and labour. While Russia is a much weaker power than the US, its inheritance of the bulk of the nuclear arsenal and military-industrial infrastructure of the former Soviet Union means that it remains America's primary military rival. Such a strategy opens up the possibility of a military confrontation with Moscow.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation has expressed strong opposition to the proposed deployments of American missile interceptors in Europe, contending that this could have a negative impact upon the Russian nuclear deterrent and is another example of Russia's legitimate security concerns being ignored. President Putin has expressed his view that the deployment would cause a new arms race. His decision to suspend compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, while not explicitly linked to the proposed anti-missile deployment, is seen as a symptom of the growing atmosphere of mistrust on security issues. Reacting to this announcement, Allies expressed profound concerns and disquiet over President Putin's statement.



In particular, NATO Allies have always complied fully with the existing and adapted CFE treaties, and hope for the ratification of the adapted Treaty as soon as Russia fully meets its Istanbul commitments to withdraw personnel and equipment from Georgia and Moldova. General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia's strategic missile forces, has gone so far as to suggest that Russia could target the "Third Site" with nuclear missiles. He also warned that Russia could withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and begin commissioning new medium-range missiles. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov raised the idea of deploying new missile weaponry in the Kaliningrad Region. The Russian Ambassador to Belarus Aleksandr Surikov was recently quoted as saying that Russia might consider deploying new nuclear facilities in Belarus in response to the US missile defence plan. Tensions rose further when it was announced that there were plans for the establishment of a further missile site in the Caucasus, possibly in Georgia. This would be another major step towards an encirclement of Russia.

On the other hand, the recent offer by President Putin to use the Gabala radar station that Russia leases in Azerbaijan for the US's missile defence system might be indicating a certain U-turn in Russia's policy. With this offer, the Kremlin, in fact, acknowledged that the proposed missile defence shield makes sense. The offer, which reportedly caught the US administration off-guard, was taken into consideration, but American officials stated that the Gabala station should be treated as an addition to the "Third Site" rather than its replacement. The Gabala station is located too close to the Iranian border to provide tracking and guiding capability for the US midcourse defence system, not to mention the fact that the station would have to be completely refurbished. The station could, however, be used as an early warning facility.

Officially Russia does not oppose missile defence, on the other hand it maintains a missile defence system to protect Moscow from long- and medium-range missiles. Russia also has considerable mobile air defence systems, which provide protection against tactical ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft. For example, the S-300 is broadly similar to the American Patriot and is also widely exported and the newer S-400 is now entering service.



The United States and NATO officials have sought to address Russian concerns by pointing out that the 10 proposed interceptors pose no threat to Russia's hundreds of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), a point which Russian officials have sometimes conceded. On the other hand, American officials dismiss claims that the interceptors have potential offensive uses noting that they do not have explosive warheads - their targets are destroyed by the force of impact.

The fears that the radar in the Czech Republic could be used to monitor Russian missile launches also appear to be baseless. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation that visited the Czech Republic in June 2007 was informed that the US radar cannot pose any threat to Russia's security interests since it would not be rotating but fixed facing the Middle East, and not the Arctic area.

Russian officials have been repeatedly briefed about United States missile defence plans, as well as NATO's missile defence work. The United States has offered to co-operate with Russia on missile defence, and to allow Russian inspectors to visit sites in Alaska, California and Central Europe, but these offers have been refused. However, Theatre Missile Defence is addressed in the NATO – Russia Council.

### **China's Reaction**

Another possible competitor of the US who has the capability of seriously threatening the strategic interests of US is China. It maybe has a much less developed nuclear weapons capability than either Washington or Moscow, however it is viewed by the US elite as the principal threat to America's continuing status as the sole world superpower. The Bush administration has identified China as its main "strategic competitor" in the twenty-first century, and much of the focus of US diplomatic and military policy, including its sabre rattling against North Korea, is aimed at securing the position of US capital in Asia.

China is developing a network of international relations in Asia, Africa and Latin America that threatens the dominance that Washington had hoped to maintain following the liquidation of



the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1991. Last but not least, China has developed a web of bilateral trade and aid deals that directly threaten US economic and geo-strategic interests. In addition, China has close ties with several countries that have been singled out by Washington as potential targets for “regime change,” including North Korea, Burma, Zimbabwe, Iran and Venezuela.

The explosion of US militarism in the Middle East and Central Asia is largely aimed at undermining the ability of its rivals, especially China, to gain access to energy supplies independent of US domination. The continuation and escalation of US militarism threatens to bring Washington and Beijing into more direct conflict. An issue of conflict between these two countries could be caused by a military enforcement of China over Taiwan, which is a long-time US ally and is claimed by Beijing as an integral part of China.

In response to the long-term US militarization of space and the development of a missile defence shield, China recently tested an anti-satellite missile system, blowing up one of its own satellites in space. Beijing’s show of force was a clear warning that it would respond to the growing threat to its own nuclear arms.

Though Beijing’s anti-satellite missile system is based on 1970s Soviet technology, China and Russia are being forced by the threat of US aggression to step up the development of their own military technologies and anti-missile shield. Not only does this mean a new stage in the arms race with Washington, but it also necessitates an escalation of other regional tensions.

## Conclusions

The "Third Site" is a bilateral project, but it raises security concerns for all Allies. So far NATO has no plans to create anti-missile shield for population centres and territory. NATO's ALTBMD (The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) programme is designed to protect deployed troops. Public opinion in NATO countries is not convinced about the necessity for the "Third Site". Public support could increase if the plan had a NATO label. However, due to geographical reasons, the "Third Site" could not provide coverage for the Allies in South-



eastern Europe. For this region, a different kind of a shield that protects against short-and medium-range missiles- is needed.

Introducing the US missile defence system in Europe could increase Allied security and enhance immunity against a possible hostile action from the East. The plan provides an opportunity to strengthen transatlantic ties and keep the United States engaged in Europe. Thus, the plan provides a tool to revitalise the Alliance. NATO needs to be involved in the “Third Site”. NATO leaders have to decide, preferably in the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, on the future European ballistic missile defence architecture. Finding a way to integrate NATO efforts with the "Third Site" would be reasonable in terms of cost.

The US and NATO need to strengthen missile defence co-operation and dialogue with Russian officials in order to ease the existing tension between Russia and the US and its Allies. It has to be clear, though, that Russia should not have a veto on this issue. Last but not least, people in NATO countries need to be provided with more information about the proposed system in order to meet existing concerns with regard to impact on health and the environment. Transparency is absolutely critical to win public support to the plan.

### Useful Links:

<http://www.nato.int> - The official site of NATO

<http://thethirdsite.com> - The Third Site: Resources and discussion of the proposed U.S. Missile Defence project in Eastern Europe

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf> - Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2002/missiledef.pdf>

<http://www.uspolicy.be/issues/missiledefense/missiledefense.asp>

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2007/space-070614-voa02.htm>

<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/02/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Missile-Defense.php>

[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/14/content\\_894651.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/14/content_894651.htm)

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17388>