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The current situation in Darfur



UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA
THESSALONIKI, GREECE

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1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Article 24

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

-UN Charter

The Security Council held its first session on January 17, 1946 at Church House, London. It is the UN's enforcer, charged with making the world a safer, more stable place by preventing or stopping armed conflict among and even within nations. The council has the authority to examine any conflict or dispute that might have international repercussions. It can identify aggressive action by states and call on UN members to make an appropriate response, including application of economic sanctions and even military action. Consequently, the council must be ready to convene at any time.

The SC is the only UN body whose resolutions are legally binding. It has the authority to decide matters that affect governments, establish peacekeeping missions, and create tribunals to try persons accused of war crimes and in extreme cases to ensure the enforcement of international law. Richard Holbrook once described the Security Council as "the most important international body in the world. Countries give it legitimacy because it can authorize the use of force for peacemaking or even a war, as in Korea, Kuwait and Afghanistan."

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United



Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

-UN Charter

1.1. MEMBERS

A Council member must always be present at UN headquarters so that the Council can meet at any time. This requirement of the UN Charter was adopted to address a weakness of the League of Nations since the former organization was often unable to respond quickly to crises. The presidency of the Security Council rotates and each state presides for one month.

The role involves setting the agenda, presiding its meetings and overseeing any crises. It alternates in alphabetical order of the members' names in English.

There are two categories of membership in the UN Security Council: Permanent Members and Elected Members.

1.1.1. Permanent Members

The Council has five permanent members:

- People's Republic of China



- French Republic
- Russian Federation
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- United States of America

The permanent members were originally drawn from the victorious powers after World War II: the Republic of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1971, the People's Republic of China was awarded the Republic of China's seat in the UN by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. In 1991, the Russian Federation acquired the seat originally held by the Soviet Union, including the Soviet Union's former representation in the Security Council.

Currently the five members are the only nations permitted to possess nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which lacks universal validity, as not all nuclear nations have signed the treaty. This nuclear status is not the result of their Security Council membership, though it is sometimes used as a modern-day justification for their continued presence on the body. North Korea, India, Pakistan, possibly Israel (though Israel has never itself admitted to nuclear weapons possession), and some other countries that are not permanent members of the UN Security Council do possess nuclear weapons outside of the anti-proliferation framework established by the Treaty.

Each permanent member state has veto powers, which can be used to void any resolution. A single blocking veto outweighs any majority.

1.1.2. Elected Members

Ten other members are elected by the General Assembly for a 2-years term starting on January 1st, five are being replaced each year. The members are chosen from regional groups and confirmed by the UN General Assembly. From the African group two members are elected; from each of the North/South American, Asian and Western European blocs two members are elected; and from the Eastern European bloc one member is chosen. The last seat rotates every two years between Asia and Africa, currently Africa.



The current (2007–2008) elected members are:

1. Belgium (W. Europe)
2. Congo (Republic of the) (Africa)
3. Ghana (Africa)
4. Indonesia (Asia)
5. Italy (W. Europe)
6. Panama (Latin America)
7. Peru (Latin America)
8. Qatar (Asia)
9. Slovakia (E. Europe)
10. South Africa (Africa)

1.2. ROLE OF MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS

Decisions in the 15-member Security Council on all substantive matters—for example, a decision calling for direct measures related to the settlement of a dispute—require the affirmative votes of nine members. A negative vote—a veto—by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes. Abstention is not regarded as a veto. Since the Security Council's inception, China (ROC/PRC) has used 5 vetoes; France, 18; Russia/USSR, 122; the United Kingdom, 32; and the United States, 81. The majority of the USSR vetoes were in the first ten years of the Council's existence, and the numbers since 1984 have been: China, 2; France, 3; Russia, 4; the United Kingdom, 10; and the United States, 43.

A state that is a member of the UN, but not of the Security Council, may participate in Security Council discussions when the Council agrees that this country's interests are particularly affected. In recent years, the Council has interpreted this loosely, enabling many countries to take part in its



discussions. Non-members are invited to participate in the Council's discussions when they are parties to disputes being considered by the Council.

1.3. ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Under Chapter Six of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the Security Council "may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute". The Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and security. These recommendations are not binding on UN members.

Under Chapter Seven, the Council has broader powers to decide what measures are to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression". In such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force "to maintain or restore international peace and security". This was the basis for UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War and the use of coalition forces in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Decisions taken under Chapter Seven, such as economic sanctions, are binding on UN members.

The UN's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which gives the Security Council the power to:

- Investigate any situation threatening international peace;
- Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute;
- Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations; and
- Enforce its decisions militarily, if necessary.

The UN has helped prevent many outbreaks of international violence from growing into wider conflicts. It has opened the way to negotiated settlements through its service as a center of debate and negotiation, as well as through UN-sponsored data collecting missions, mediators, and truce



observers. UN peacekeeping forces, comprised of troops and equipment supplied by member nations, have usually been able to limit or prevent conflict. Some conflicts, however, have proven to be beyond the capacity of the UN to manage. The key to the success of UN peacekeeping missions is the willingness of the parties in a conflict to negotiate peacefully through a viable political process.

1.4. RESOLUTIONS

The legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions has been the subject of controversy. It is generally agreed that resolutions are legally binding if they fall under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the Charter. The Council has also the authority to draft resolutions under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes); most authorities do not consider these to be legally binding. The International Court of Justice suggested in the *Namibia* case that resolutions other than those made under Chapter VI can also be binding, a view questioned by a few member states. It is beyond doubt however that those resolutions drafted apart from these two Chapters dealing with the internal governance of the organization (such as the admission of new Member States) are legally binding, where the Charter gives the Security Council power to draft them.

If the council cannot reach consensus or a passing vote on a resolution, they may choose to produce a non-binding Presidential Statement instead of a Resolution. They are adopted by consensus but often require similar behind-closed-doors wrangling. They are meant to apply political pressure, a warning that the council is paying attention and further action may follow. Press statements typically accompany both resolutions and Presidential Statements, carrying the text of the document adopted by the body and also some explanatory text. They may also be released independently, after a significant meeting.



1.5. NEGOTIATING PEACE AT THE TABLE, BUILDING PEACE ON THE GROUND

Article 43

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

-UN Charter

The United Nations has evolved generations of peace operations that have shaped its peacebuilding strategy. The political strategy of a peacebuilding mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its design. Just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Peacebuilding is about what needs to happen in between. Civil wars arise when individuals, groups and factions discover that a policeman, judge, soldier or politician no longer speaks and acts for them.

“Peace-building done well is a powerful deterrent to violent conflict,” said the Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and he also added: “Peace-building is not a dramatic imposition of a grand plan, but a process of building pillars of peace from the ground up, bit by bit. Whether it starts before, after or during the eruption of conflict, peace-building must be seen as a long-term exercise. At the same time, there is an unmistakable element of urgency -- a need to achieve tangible progress on a number of fronts in a short time. Among the major challenges of peace-building is the mobilization of sustained political will and resources on the part of the international community, the Secretary-General said. A number of good ideas would have been put forward in key areas, such as the implementation of peace



agreements and the design of peacekeeping operations which the Security Council could incorporate into its future mandates.”¹

2. THE SITUATION IN DARFUR

2.1. PREFACE

The Darfur conflict is an ongoing armed conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan, mainly between the Janjaweed² (translated: "devils on horseback"), a militia group recruited from the tribes of the Abbala Rizeigat (camel-herding Arabs), and the non-Baggara people (mostly land-tilling tribes) of the region. The Sudanese government, while publicly denying that it supports the Janjaweed, has provided money and assistance and has participated in joint attacks with the group, systematically targeting the Fur,³ Zaghawa,⁴ and Massalit⁵ ethnic groups in Darfur. The conflict

¹ Press Release SC/7007: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7007.doc.htm>

² Janjaweed: The word, an Arabic colloquialism, means "a man with a gun on a horse." Janjaweed militiamen are primarily members of nomadic "Arab" tribes who've long been at odds with Darfur's settled "African" farmers, who are darker-skinned. (The labels Arab and African are rather misleading, given the complexity of the region's ethnic history. For simplicity's sake, Explainer will stick with these inelegant terms.) Until 2003, the conflicts were mostly over Darfur's scarce water and land resources—desertification has been a serious problem, so grazing areas and wells are at a premium. In fact, the term "Janjaweed" has for years been synonymous with bandit, as these horse- or camel-borne fighters were known to swoop in on non-Arab farms to steal cattle.

The Janjaweed started to become much more aggressive in 2003, after two non-Arab groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, took up arms against the Sudanese government, alleging mistreatment by the Arab regime in Khartoum. In response to the uprising, the Janjaweed militias began pillaging towns and villages inhabited by members of the African tribes from which the rebel armies draw their strength—the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur tribes. (This conflict is entirely separate from the 22-year-old civil war that has pitted the Muslim government against Christian and animist rebels in the country's southern region. The Janjaweed, who inhabit western Sudan, have nothing to do with that war.)

³ The Fur are the largest ethnic group in the Darfur region of western Sudan. They are also sometimes referred to by the names Fora, Fordunga, Furawi, Konjara or Kungara. They are an active agricultural people and may also herd cattle. Some Fur families who have accumulated a substantial cattle herd developed a more nomadic lifestyle like that of their



began in July 2003. Unlike in the Second Sudanese Civil War, which was fought between the primarily Muslim north and Christian and Animist south, in Darfur most of the residents are Muslim, as are the Janjaweed.

After fighting worsened in July and August 2006, on August 31, 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 which called for a new 17,300-troop UN peacekeeping force to supplant or supplement a poorly funded, ill-equipped 7,000-troop African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeeping force. Sudan strongly objected to the resolution and said that it would see the UN forces in the region as foreign invaders. The next day, the Sudanese military launched a major offensive in the region.⁶

Estimated number of deaths in the conflict varies widely. According to Sudan's government, 9,000 people have been killed; most NGOs use 200,000 to over 400,000, a figure from the Coalition for International Justice that has since been cited by the United Nations. As many as 2.5 million are thought to have been displaced as of October 2006. The mass media once described the conflict as

herding neighbors, the Baqqara (Baggara) Arabs. Culturally, those cattle-herding Fur are now considered to be Baqqara.

The Fur are nominally Sunni Muslims following the Maliki school of Islamic law. They are kin to the Kanuri people of Nigeria, with whom they maintained contacts over the centuries. The Fur area, called Darfur, was ruled by the Borno kingdom of the Kanuri in Nigeria as late as the 17th century.

⁴ Zaghawa is an African ethnic group, mainly living in eastern Chad and western Sudan, including the Darfur province of Sudan. They are semi-nomadic and obtain much of their livelihood through herding cattle, camels and sheep, and harvesting wild grains. Several centuries ago, they converted to Islam though they still maintain some of their religious traditions. They have their own language, which is also called Zaghawa, and the breed of sheep that they herd is called Zaghawa. They, however, refer to themselves as the Beri, while the name Zaghawa was given to them by the nearby Arab peoples, and became more well-known. While they are not very powerful in Sudan, they politically dominate Chad. The current president, Idriss Déby and several former prime ministers of Chad are Zaghawa, as well as many other members of the government.

⁵ The Massalit are a people of Darfur in western Sudan and Wadai in eastern Chad. They speak Masalit, a Nilo-Saharan language of the Maba group.

⁶ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706:*

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement>



both "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide," and now do so without hesitation. The United States government has described it as genocide, although the United Nations has declined to do so. In March 2007 the U.N. mission accused Sudan's government of orchestrating and taking part in "gross violations" in Darfur and called for urgent international action to protect civilians there.

2.1.1. Historical data

The conflict taking place in Darfur has many interwoven causes. While rooted in structural inequality between the center of the country around the Nile and the 'peripheral' areas such as Darfur, tensions were exacerbated in the last two decades of the twentieth century by a combination of environmental calamity, political opportunism and regional politics. A point of particular confusion has been the characterization of the conflict as one between 'Arab' and 'African' populations, a dichotomy that one historian describes as "both true and false". Western powers have also been accused of covertly exacerbating tensions to counter recent Chinese-Sudanese oil cooperation, and to deter further oil deals by China in the region.

In the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, the Keira⁷ dynasty of the Fur people of the Marrah Mountains established a sultanate with Islam as the state religion. The sultanate was conquered by the Turco-Egyptian force expanding south along the Nile, which was in turn defeated by the Muhammad Ahmad, the self-proclaimed Mahdi. The Mahdist state collapsed under the onslaught of the British force led by Herbert Kitchener, who established an Anglo-Egyptian condominium to rule Sudan. The British allowed Darfur de jure autonomy until 1916 when they invaded and incorporated the region into Sudan. Within Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the bulk of resources were devoted toward Khartoum and Blue Nile Province, leaving the rest of the country relatively undeveloped.

⁷ The Keira dynasty was the rulers of the Sultanate of Darfur from the seventeenth century to 1916. Originally the Keira clan was perhaps regional ruler in the Tunjur state, with Sulayman traditionally seen as the founder of the Darfur state. The monarchy was suspended after the Egyptian conquest of the region in 1874, but was revived as a de facto independent state in 1898 after the defeat of the Mahdiah. The Keira dynasty finally ended in 1916 when the British annexed Darfur to the Sudan.



The inhabitants of the Nile Valley, which had received the bulk of British investment, continued the pattern of economic and political marginalization after independence was achieved in 1956. In the 1968 elections, factionalism within the ruling Umma Party led candidates, notably Sadiq al-Mahdi, to try to split off portions of the Darfuri electorate either by blaming the region's underdevelopment on the Arabs, in the case of appeals to the stationary peoples, or by appealing to the Baggara semi-nomads to support their fellow Nile Arabs. This Arab-African dichotomy, which was not an indigenously developed way of perceiving local relations, was exacerbated after Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi became focused on establishing an Arab belt across the Sahel and promulgated an ideology of Arab supremacy. As a result of a sequence of interactions between Sudan, Libya and Chad from the late 1960s through the 1980s, including the creation of the Libyan-supported Islamic Legion, Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry established Darfur as a rear base for the rebel force led by Hissène Habré, which was attempting to overthrow the Chadian government and was also anti-Gaddafi.

In 1983 and 1984, the rains failed and the region was plunged into a famine. The famine killed an estimated 95,000 people out of a population of 3.1 million. Nimeiry was overthrown on 5 April 1985, and Sadiq al-Mahdi came out of exile, making a deal with Gaddafi, which al-Mahdi did not honor, to turn over Darfur to Libya if he was supplied with the funds to win the upcoming elections.

In early 2003, two local rebel groups — the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)⁸ and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)⁹ — accused the government of oppressing non-Arabs. The

⁸ The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a rebel group involved in the Darfur conflict of Sudan. It is led by Khalil Ibrahim. Along with other rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Army, they are fighting against the government-supported Janjaweed militia. The JEM is also a member of the Eastern Front, a rebel coalition formerly active in the east of Sudan along the Eritrean border.

⁹ The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army or *Haraka Tahrir Sudan* (abbreviated as either SLM or SLA) is a loose association of Sudanese rebel groups who fought against the Janjaweed Arab militiamen and Sudanese government forces in the Darfur conflict. It has largely divided into factions. The leader of the largest faction is Minni Minnawi and is now allied with the government. Other leaders of factions that continue fighting the government include Ahmed Abdulshafi Bassey and Abdulwahid Mohamed Nour who is largely supported by the people of Darfur. Minnawi is



SLM, which is much larger than the JEM, is generally associated with the Fur and Masalit, as well as the Wagi clan of the Zaghawa, while the JEM is associated with the Kobe clan of Zaghawa. Later that year, leaders of both groups, the Sudanese Government and representatives of the International diplomatic community were brought together in Geneva by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue to look at ways of addressing the humanitarian crisis. In 2004, the JEM joined the Eastern Front, a group set up in 2004 as an alliance between two eastern tribal rebel groups, the Rashaida tribe's Free Lions and the Beja Congress. The JEM has also been accused of being controlled by Hassan al-Turabi.

On January 20, 2006, SLM declared a merger with the Justice and Equality Movement to form the Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan. However, in May of that year, the SLM and JEM were again negotiating as separate entities.

The starting point of the conflict in the Darfur region is typically said to be 26 February 2003, when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) publicly claimed credit for an attack on Golo, the headquarters of Jebel Marra District. Even prior to this attack, however, a conflict had erupted in Darfur, as rebels had already attacked police stations, army outposts and military convoys, and the government had engaged in a massive air and land assault on the rebel stronghold in the Marrah Mountains. The rebels' first military action was a successful attack on an army garrison on the mountain on 25 February 2002 and the Sudanese government had been aware of a unified rebel movement since an attack on the Golo police station in June 2002. Chroniclers Julie Flint and Alex de Waal state that the beginning of the rebellion is better dated to 21 July 2001, when a group of Zaghawa and Fur met in Abu Gamra and swore oaths on the Qur'an to work together to defend against government-sponsored attacks on their villages. It should be noted that nearly all of the residents of Darfur are Muslim, as are the Janjaweed and the government leaders in Khartoum.

On 25 March, the rebels seized the garrison town of Tine along the Chadian border, seizing large quantities of supplies and arms. Despite a threat by President Omar al-Bashir to "unleash" the

hated by many people of Darfur including people from his own Zaghawa tribe. The peace agreement that is signed by Minnawi's faction is widely rejected by the Darfurians and especially by the Fur, the largest ethnic group in Darfur.

Check: <http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/214.shtml> , for more information about SLM.



army, the military had little in reserve. The army was already deployed both to the south, where the Second Sudanese Civil War was drawing to an end, and the east, where rebels sponsored by Eritrea were threatening the newly constructed pipeline from the central oilfields to Port Sudan. The rebel tactic of hit-and-run raids using Toyota Land Cruisers to speed across the semi-desert region proved almost impossible for the army, untrained in desert operations, to counter. However, its aerial bombardment of rebel positions on the mountain was devastating.

At 5:30 am on 25 April 2003, a joint Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and JEM force in 33 Land Cruisers entered al-Fashir and attacked the sleeping garrison. In the next four hours, four Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships, according to the government, (seven according to the rebels) were destroyed on the ground, 75 soldiers, pilots and technicians were killed and 32 were captured, including the commander of the air base, a Major General. The success of the raid was unprecedented in Sudan; in the 20 years of the war in the south, the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)¹⁰ had never carried out such an operation.

The al-Fashir raid was a turning point both militarily and psychologically. The armed forces had been humiliated by the al-Fashir raid and the government was faced with a difficult strategic situation. The armed forces would clearly need to be retrained and redeployed to fight this new kind of war and there were well-founded concerns about the loyalty of the many Darfurian non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the army. Responsibility for prosecuting the war was given to Sudanese Military Intelligence. Nevertheless, in the middle months of 2003, the rebels won 34 of 38 engagements. In May, the SLA destroyed a battalion at Kutum, killing 500 and taking 300 prisoners and in mid-July, 250 were killed in a second attack on Tine. The SLA began to infiltrate farther east, threatening to extend the war into Kordofan.

However, at this point the government changed its strategy. Given that the army was being consistently defeated, the war effort depended on three elements: Military Intelligence, the air force,

¹⁰ Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) is a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the main opposition group in Sudan. As a rebel group it was formed in 1983 by John Garang de Mabior, Salva Kiir Mayardit, William Nyuon Bany and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. It has since fought against the governments of Gaafar Nimeiry, Sadiq al-Mahdi and President Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir in what is now called the Second Sudanese Civil War. It was led by John Garang, a Dinka, until his death on 30 July 2005. The political wing of the SPLA is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Al-Harakat Ash-Shaabia Le Tahreer As-Sudan), today a political party.



and the Janjaweed, armed Baggara herders whom the government had begun directing in repression of a Masalit uprising in 1996-1999. The Janjaweed were put at the center of the new counter-insurgency strategy. Military resources were poured into Darfur and the Janjaweed were outfitted as a paramilitary force, complete with communication equipment and some artillery. The probable results of such a strategy were clear to the military planners; similar strategies undertaken in the Nuba Mountains and around the southern oil fields during the previous decade had resulted in massive human rights violations and forced displacements.

The better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand. By the spring of 2004, several thousand people — mostly from the non-Arab population — had been killed and as many as a million more had been driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The crisis took on an international dimension when over 100,000 refugees poured into neighbouring Chad, pursued by Janjaweed militiamen, who clashed with Chadian government forces along the border. More than 70 militiamen and 10 Chadian soldiers were killed in one gun battle in April. A United Nations observer team reported that non-Arab villages were singled out while Arab villages were left untouched.

In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government, JEM, and SLM. A group splintered from the JEM in April — the National Movement for Reform and Development — which did not participate in the April cease-fire talks or agreement. Janjaweed and rebel attacks have continued since the ceasefire. The African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor observance of the putative ceasefire.

The scale of the crisis led to warnings of an imminent disaster, with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warning that the risk of genocide is frighteningly real in Darfur. The scale of the Janjaweed campaign led to comparisons with the Rwandan Genocide, a parallel hotly denied by the Sudanese government. Independent observers noted that the tactics, which include dismemberment and killing of non-combatants and even young children and babies, are more akin to the ethnic cleansing used in the Yugoslav Wars but have warned that the region's remoteness means that hundreds of thousands are effectively cut off from aid. The Brussels-based International



Crisis Group reported in May 2004 that over 350,000 people could potentially die as a result of starvation and disease.

On 10 July 2005, Ex-SPLA leader John Garang was sworn in as Sudan's vice-president. However, on 30 July 2005, Garang died in a helicopter crash. His death had long-term implications and, despite improved security, talks between the various rebels in the Darfur region went slowly.

An attack on the Chadian town of Adre near the Sudanese border led to the deaths of three hundred rebels in December 2005. Sudan was blamed for the attack, which was the second in the region in three days. The escalating tensions in the region led to the government of Chad declaring its hostility toward Sudan and calling for Chadian citizens to mobilise themselves against the "common enemy".

2.2. CURRENT SITUATION

On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan signed an accord with the faction of the SLA led by Minni Minnawi. However, the agreement was rejected by two other, smaller groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and a rival faction of the SLA. The accord was orchestrated by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, Salim Ahmed Salim (working on behalf of the African Union), AU representatives, and other foreign officials operating in Abuja, Nigeria. The accord calls for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army.

During July and August 2006, fighting had been renewed, "threatening to shut down the world's largest aid operation" as international aid organizations considered leaving due to attacks against their personnel. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for bringing a force of 18,000 international peacekeepers to the region in order to replace the African Union force of 7,000 (AMIS).¹¹

¹¹ *AMIS Official Website:*

<http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm>



"Securing the consent of the government of Sudan will require continued intensive discussions with Khartoum by council members, by key member states and regional organisations, as well as by the United Nations," Mr Kofi Annan said.

"No effort should be spared to send the simple, powerful message: International involvement will increase the chances of peace taking root in Darfur, will strengthen the credibility of the peace process and the protection of the suffering populations of Darfur," added Mr Kofi Annan.

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force operating primarily in the country's western region of Darfur with the aim of performing peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. Originally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005, its numbers were increased to about 7,000. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564,¹² AMIS is to "closely and continuously liaise and coordinate ... at all levels" its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). AMIS has been, and as of October 2006 remains, the only external military force in Sudan's Darfur region.

On August 18, the deputy head of the UN Peacekeeping Forces, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi, warned during a private meeting that Sudan appears to be undertaking preparations for a major military offensive in the region. The warning came a day after UN Commission on Human Rights special investigator Sima Samar stated that Sudan's efforts in the region remains poor despite the May Agreement. On August 19, Sudan reiterated its opposition to replacing the 7,000 AU force with a 17,000 UN one, resulting in the US issuing a "threat" to Sudan over the "potential consequences" of this position.

On August 24, Sudan rejected attending a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting to explain its plan of sending 10,000 Sudanese soldiers to Darfur instead of the proposed 20,000 UN peacekeeping force. The UNSC announced it will hold the meeting despite Sudan's refusal to attend. Also on August 24, the International Rescue Committee reported that hundreds of women were raped and sexually assaulted around the Kalma refugee camp during the last several weeks. The Janjaweed has used rape as a weapon. Culturally in the region, raped women are considered unclean, and are ostracized. Women are even raped in open, public places to increase humiliation

¹² *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564:*

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/515/47/PDF/N0451547.pdf?OpenElement>



for them and their families. The extent of rape used in attacks is likely greater than documented, because women who have been raped are usually reluctant to come forward. On August 25, the head of the US State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer, warned that the region faces a security crisis unless the proposed UN peacekeeping force is allowed to deploy.

On August 26, two days before the UNSC meeting, and on the day Frazer was due to arrive in Khartoum, Paul Salopek, a US National Geographic Magazine journalist appeared in court in Darfur facing charges of espionage; he had crossed into the country illegally from Chad, due to the strict rules against foreign journalists. He was later released after direct negotiation with President al-Bashir. This came a month after Tomo Kriznar, a Slovenian presidential envoy, was sentenced to two years for spying.

2.3. UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS

2.3.1. New proposed UN peacekeeping force

On August 31, 2006, the UNSC approved a resolution to send a new peacekeeping force of 17,300 to the region. Sudan has expressed strong opposition to the resolution. On September 1, 2006, AU officials reported that Sudan has launched a major offensive in Darfur. According to the AU, over 20 people were killed and 1,000 were displaced during clashes that began earlier in the week. On September 5, Sudan has asked the AU force in Darfur to leave the region by the end of the month, adding that "they have no right to transfer this assignment to the United Nations or any other party. This right rests with the government of Sudan." On September 4, 2006, in a move not viewed as surprising, Chad's president Idriss Déby voiced support for the new UN peacekeeping force. The AU, whose peacekeeping force mandate expires on September 30, 2006, has confirmed that they will do so. The next day, however, a senior US State Department official who declined to be identified, told reporters that the AU force might remain in the region past the deadline, citing this possibility as a "viable, live option."



2.3.2. Failure of implementation of the UN peacekeeping force

On September 8, 2006, head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, said Darfur faces a "humanitarian catastrophe." On September 12, 2006, Sudan's European Union envoy Pekka Haavisto claimed that the Sudanese army is "bombing civilians in Darfur." A World Food Program official reported that food aid has been cut off from at least 355,000 people in the region. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the UNSC that "the tragedy in Darfur has reached a critical moment. It merits this council's closest attention and urgent action."

On September 14, 2006, the leader of the now defunct Sudan Liberation Movement, currently Senior Assistant to the President of the Republic and Chairman of the Regional Interim Authority of Darfur, Minni Minnawi, stated that he does not object to the new UN peacekeeping force, thereby breaking ranks with the Sudanese government who consider such a deployment to be an act of Western invasion. Minnawi claimed that the AU force "can do nothing because the AU mandate is very limited." Khartoum, however, remained sternly against the UN peacekeeping force, with Sudanese president Al-Bashir depicting it as a colonial plan, and stating that "we do not want Sudan to turn into another Iraq."

"We've seen U.N. forces everywhere, for example in Congo, or in Rwanda. They don't seem to really take an active role in stopping whatever they were sent to stop. The U.N. forces are there, and still there is much killing going on, so I don't know what they are coming to do in Darfur," said Mr. Stephen Missa Dhunya (a former member of the Sudanese Parliament).

2.3.3. Escalation (October-November 2006)

On October 2, with the UN force plan indefinitely suspended on account of Sudanese opposition, the AU announced that it will extend its presence in the region until December 31, 2006. Two hundred UN troops were sent to reinforce the AU force. On October 6, the UNSC voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan until April 30, 2007. On October 9, the Food and Agriculture Organization listed Sudan's Darfur region as the most pressing food emergency out of the forty countries listed on its Crop Prospects and Food Situation report. On



October 10, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, claimed that the Sudanese government had prior knowledge of attacks by Janjaweed militias in Buram, South Darfur the month before, an attack which saw hundreds of civilians killed.

On October 12, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria Joy Ogwu arrived in Darfur for a two-day visit. She urged the Sudanese government to accept a UN formula. Speaking in Ethiopia, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo spoke against "stand[ing] by and see[ing] genocide being developed in Darfur." On October 13, US President George W. Bush imposed further sanctions against those deemed complicit in the Darfur atrocities under the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006. The measures were said to strengthen existing sanctions by prohibiting US citizens from engaging in oil-related transactions with Sudan (although US companies were prohibited from doing any business with Sudan since 1997), freezing the assets of complicit parties and denying them entry to the US.

Because the African Union Mission in Sudan is underfunded and badly equipped, it was supposed that until December 31, violence in Darfur would have worsened, with government troops and allied militias, as well as rebels, blamed for new attacks. Aid workers say their access is severely limited by fighting, and some have warned the humanitarian situation could deteriorate to levels seen in 2003 and 2004 when U.N. officials called Darfur the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

On 22 October 2006, the Sudanese government told U.N. envoy Jan Pronk to leave the country within three days. Pronk, the senior U.N. official in the country, had been heavily criticized by the army after he posted a description of several recent military defeats in Darfur to his personal blog. On November 1, the US announced that it will be formulating an international plan which they hoped the Sudanese government will find more palatable. On November 9, senior Sudanese presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie told reporters that his government is prepared to start unconditional talks with the National Redemption Front (NRF)¹³ - the rebel alliance in Darfur- but

¹³ The National Redemption Front (NRF) is an alliance of fighting groups in Darfur. According to their foundation declaration, the NRF consists of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a holdout faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). NRF opposes the Abuja peace agreement,



noted he saw little use for a new peace agreement. The NRF, who had rejected the May Agreement (only an inter-SLM faction was signatory to it), did not issue a comment. It had previously sought a new peace agreement. In late 2006, Darfur Arabs started their own rebel group, The Popular Forces Troops, and announced on December 6 that they had repulsed an assault by the Sudanese army at Kas-Zallingi the previous day. In a statement, they called the Janjaweed mercenaries who do not represent Darfur's Arabs.

2.3.4. Proposed compromise UN force and Sudanese offensive

On November 17, reports of a potential deal to place a "compromise peacekeeping force" in Darfur were announced, but would later appear to have been rejected by Sudan. The UN, nonetheless, claimed on November 18 that Sudan agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Sudan's Foreign Minister Lam Akol stated that "there should be no talk about a mixed force" and that the UN's role should be restricted to technical support. Also on November 18, the AU reported that Sudanese military and Sudanese-backed militias had launched a ground and air operation in the region which resulted in about 70 civilian deaths. The AU stated that this "was a flagrant violation of security agreements."

On November 25, a spokesperson for United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour accused the Sudanese government of having committed "a deliberate and unprovoked attack" against civilians in the town of Sirba on November 11, which claimed the lives of at least 30 people. The Commissioner's statement maintained that "contrary to the government's claim, it appears that the Sudanese Armed Forces launched a deliberate and unprovoked attack on civilians and their property in Sirba," and that this also involved "extensive and wanton destruction and looting of civilian property."

2.3.5. Progress during 2007

Cease-fire agreement

signed by the SLA faction led by Minni Minnawi and the Sudanese government on May 5. The group was formed in late June 2006 after the Abuja Agreement.



According to the Save Darfur Coalition, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and President al-Bashir have agreed to a cease-fire whereby the Sudanese "government and rebel groups will cease hostilities for a period of 60 days while they work towards a lasting peace."

On March 7, the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has written a new letter to the Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, featuring a proposed United Nations-African Union (AU) hybrid force, of up to 24,000 personnel, to help resolve the deadly conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, which has already killed over 200,000 people and uprooted 2.5 million more.

"The letter is in line with our agreement to proceed in transparency and share with the Sudanese Government the joint AU-UN planning on a strengthened peacekeeping presence in Darfur," declared Mr. Ban Ki-moon.

In the meantime, UNMIS condemned the killing of two AU soldiers and the injuring of a third, in South Darfur. It voiced deep concern at "the repeated attacks targeting those who are assisting the people of Darfur, in particular AMIS and humanitarian workers." UNMIS called on all parties to respect the neutral and impartial status of AMIS and recalled that any attack against AU personnel was a serious violation of international law and relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

On March 9, the Secretary-General received the reply of Sudan's President, which, however, was "not satisfactory" according to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, while dissatisfaction is growing among the Member States.

On March 16, the head of the United Nations High-Level Mission Mrs. Jody Williams said, while presenting her report to the Human Rights Council, that: the Sudanese Government forces, allied Janjaweed militias and rebel groups are guilty of serious human rights abuses and violations of international law in Darfur, where murders, rapes, acts of torture and arbitrary arrest occur with chilling frequency. She mentioned that civilians had become the main target in the conflict, and called the Sudanese Government to cooperate with the deployment of the proposed hybrid UN-



African Union (AU) force without delay and to give its full cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC),¹⁴ which may hold war crimes trials.

2.4. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

On 3 July 2004, the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations signed a Joint Communiqué¹⁵ on the occasion of the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Sudan (that visit was held between 29 June-3 July 2004).

The Joint Communiqué identified the commitments of the Government of the Sudan to resolve the Darfur crisis. It also contained the United Nations' commitment to assist in this matter. In the Joint Communiqué, the two parties agreed to form a high level Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM). The mandate of the JIM is to closely follow and appraise developments and periodically report on the progress in the implementation of the Joint Communiqué. The JIM is co-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the Government of the Sudan, and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the Sudan, for the United Nations and its partners. There is an ongoing political process on Darfur, aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the fighting. The process is led by the African Union, and yielded positive results in November 2004, with the signing of Humanitarian and Security Protocols between the Government and the SLM/A and JEM.

The Joint Communiqué led to the launch of a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, concerning the Darfur Situation in Sudan, which have been arisen from 2004 till today.

¹⁴ Sudan's humanitarian affairs minister Ahmed Haroun and a Janjaweed militia leader, known as Ali Kushayb have been charged with 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, by the International Criminal Court. Ahmed Haroun said he "did not feel guilty", his conscience was clear and that he was ready to defend himself.

Visit: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6404467.stm>

¹⁵ Joint Communiqué between the UN and the government of Sudan, 3 July 2004:

<http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/JC.pdf>



2.4.1. UN SC RES 1556

The Security Council, having considered the latest developments and having taken into consideration the UN Security Council RES-1547 (2004),¹⁶ adopting the UN SC RES-1556 (2004)¹⁷, have called on the Government of Sudan to fulfil immediately all of the commitments it made in the 3 July 2004 Communiqué. The SC demanded that the Government of Sudan should fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities, and further requests the Secretary-General to report in 30 days, and monthly thereafter, to the Council on the progress or lack thereof by the Government of Sudan on this matter.

2.4.2. UN SC RES 1574

Through RES-1574 (2004),¹⁸ the Security Council strongly supported the efforts of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army to reach a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, while it welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in Nairobi on 19 November 2004 entitled "Declaration on the conclusion of IGAD¹⁹ negotiations on peace in the Sudan", attached to this resolution, and the agreement that the six protocols referred to in the Nairobi Declaration of 5 June 2004 constituted and formed the core Peace Agreement, and strongly supported the parties' commitment to reach a final comprehensive agreement by 31 December 2004.

¹⁶ UN SC RES 1547:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/PDF/N0444602.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁷ UN SC RES 1556:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/PDF/N0444602.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸ UN SC RES 1574:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/616/89/PDF/N0461689.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁹ IGAD:

<http://www.igad.org/>



2.4.3. UN SC RES 1590

The UN Security Council RES-1590 (2005)²⁰ established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), for an initial period of 6 months and further regulated that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component including up to 715 civilian police personnel. It also requested that the UNMIS would closely and continuously liaise and coordinate, at all levels, with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

2.4.4. UN SC RES 1593

The Security Council, through the UN SC RES-1593 (2005),²¹ stressed out its disappointment due to weakness of finding a viable solution, and announced that it is going to refer the situation in Darfur, since 1 July 2002, to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Moreover, the Security Council invited the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court.

2.4.5. UN SC RES 1679

The Security Council supported the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council, concerning the transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation, and by UN SC RES-1679 (2006),²² called upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to facilitate and work with the African Union, the United Nations, regional and international organizations and Member States to accelerate transition to a United Nations operation.²³

²⁰ UN SC RES 1590:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement>

²¹ UN SC RES 1593:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement>

²² UN SC RES 1679:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/350/24/PDF/N0635024.pdf?OpenElement>

²³ View also the Report of the Secretary General, SG REP-591 (2006):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/447/27/PDF/N0644727.pdf?OpenElement>



2.4.6. UN SC RES 1706

Due to the deterioration of the situation in Darfur, the Security Council decided that UNMIS should be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units. The UN SC RES-1706 (2006)²⁴ expressed the Security Council's determination to maintain the strength and the structure of the UNMIS under regular review, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground and without prejudice to its current operations and mandate as provided for in resolution 1590 (2005). The Resolution also underlined that the mandate of UNMIS in Darfur should be to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006 and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. In a related provision of the text, the Security Council decided further that the mandate of UNMIS in Darfur would also include assisting in international efforts to improve the security situation in the neighbouring regions along the borders between the Sudan and Chad and between the Sudan and the Central African Republic.²⁵

2.4.7. UN SC RES 1714

The deterioration of the situation in Darfur and the lack of a resulting to a viable solution, led the Security Council through the UN SC RES-1714 (2006),²⁶ to the decision of the extension of the mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2007, with the intention to renew it for further periods, in case that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.²⁷

²⁴ UN SC RES 1706:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁵ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8821.doc.htm>

²⁶ UN SC RES 1714:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/556/93/PDF/N0655693.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁷ **View also the following UN Security Council Resolutions:**

UN SC RES 1564 (2004):



2.4.8. REPORTS ON DARFUR/ SUDAN SITUATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

The Secretary General is authorized to introduce Reports concerning the Darfur situation, portraying the most recent events. It is also requested by the Security Council that the Secretary General would assist the Council during the implementation of the mandate of UNMIS. The Secretary General announces monthly Reports relating to the progress that have been made in Sudan.²⁸

2.5. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN

United Nations Mission in Sudan was adopted by the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005.²⁹ UNMIS has been mandated by the UN Security to monitor and support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, which was signed by the

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/515/47/PDF/N0451547.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1585 (2005):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/266/38/PDF/N0526638.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1591 (2005):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/287/89/PDF/N0528789.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1627 (2005):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/521/57/PDF/N0552157.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1651 (2005):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/658/72/PDF/N0565872.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1663 (2006):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/283/61/PDF/N0628361.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1665 (2006):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/290/22/PDF/N0629022.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1672 (2006):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/326/77/PDF/N0632677.pdf?OpenElement>
UN SC RES 1713 (2006):

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/545/13/PDF/N0654513.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁸ Reports of the Secretary General: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm>

²⁹ *UN SC RES 1590:*

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement>



Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005. UNMIS replaced the former UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) (which was adopted by the UN Resolution 1547 on 11 June 2004). UNMIS is also tasked with providing political and logistical support to the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS).

3. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ON DARFUR CRISIS

International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by the advocacy organizations Amnesty International in July 2003 and the International Crisis Group in December 2003. However, widespread media coverage did not start until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan,³⁰ Mukesh Kapila, called Darfur the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis" in March 2004. A movement advocating for humanitarian intervention has emerged in several countries since then.

Is it genocide?

G rard Prunier,³¹ a scholar specializing in African conflicts, argues that the world's most powerful countries have largely limited their response to expressions of concern and demands that the United Nations take action. The UN, lacking both the funding and military support of the wealthy countries, has left the African Union to deploy a token force (AMIS) without a mandate to protect civilians. In the lack of foreign political will to address the political and economic structures that underlie the conflict, the international community has defined the Darfur conflict in humanitarian assistance terms and debated the "genocide" label.

³⁰ View the following Research/ UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan:

<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/hprofile/2005/jan/1.%20Narrative.pdf>

³¹ G rard Prunier is research professor at the University of Paris and director of the French Centre for Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa. Part of his recent article "Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide" is available in the following website:

http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa_democracy/darfur_conflict_3909.jsp



On September 18, 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1564, which called for a Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to assess the Sudanese conflict. The UN report released on January 31, 2005 stated that while there were mass murders and rapes, they could not label it as genocide because "genocidal intent appears to be missing".³²

In 2005, Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL) and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which calls on the United States to take a more active role in stopping the alleged genocide, encourages NATO participation, and endorses a Chapter VII mandate for a UN mission in Darfur. The bill was passed by the House and Senate and as of August 2006 is in conference committee.

On October 20 2006, 120 genocide survivors of the Holocaust, the Cambodian and Rwandan Genocides, backed by six aid agencies, submitted an open letter to the European Union, calling on them to do more to end the atrocities in Darfur, with a UN peacekeeping force as "the only viable option." Aegis Trust director, James Smith, stated that while "the African Union has worked very well in Darfur and done what it could, the rest of the world hasn't supported those efforts the way it should have done with sufficient funds and sufficient equipment."³³

³² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_response_to_the_Darfur_conflict#Peacekeeping_and_Military_Response

³³ View article:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6069600.stm>



- Delegates are requested to have studied the following article, concerning the situation in Darfur:

“Getting the UN into Darfur”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°43, 12 October 2006

The above article can be found at the Documentation in the Security Council sector of ThessISMUN 2007 official website.

SUDAN/ DARFUR MAP



Source Wikipedia Website: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Fur_map.png



4. USEFUL LINKS

- United Nations Security Council:
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>
- Permanent Missions to the UN in New York:
<http://www.un.int/index-en/webs.html>
- United Nations Charter:
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<http://www.nato.int>
- European Union
<http://www.europa.eu.int/>
- Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<http://www.osce.org/>
- African Union
<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<http://www.unhcr.org>

Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Belgium: <http://www.diplomatie.be/en/default.asp>

China: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/default.htm>

Congo (Republic of the): <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cf.html>



France: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/>

Ghana: <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/governing/ministries/governance/foreign.php>

Indonesia: <http://www.deplu.go.id/>

Italy: <http://www.esteri.it/eng/index.asp>

Panama: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pm.html>

Peru: <http://www.rree.gob.pe/portal/mre.nsf/Index?OpenForm>

Qatar: <http://www.mofa.gov.qa/>

Russian Federation: <http://www.mid.ru/>

Slovakia: <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/En/index.html>

South Africa: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/>

United Kingdom: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>

USA: <http://www.state.gov/>

Other links

<http://www.darfurinfo.org/>

<http://strategyleader.org/profiles/fur.html>