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## United Nations Economic and Social Council Topic Area B

*Economic and social needs of countries emerging from conflict and post-conflict countries. Special cases of Iraq, Lebanon and the African Regions.*



UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA  
THESSALONIKI, GREECE

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

**Rogue states** are defined in literature as the ones where sovereign control and the rule of law cease to exist and where the state is unable to enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. If failed and failing states are left to languish and the viability of new democracies is not supported, the security of the people within these states will continue to be at risk. Not only will conflicts be prolonged, but they may in fact spread. Were this to occur, it would make it increasingly difficult for the international community to create conditions that provide for human security. In fact, an absence of human security may trigger collective or individual responses from concerned states invoking “the responsibility to protect.”

**State-building** is a term used in literature to describe the process of establishment of a well functioning state. This concept was first used in connection to the creation of states in Western Europe and focused on the power enforcement of state in society. In the American context, some commentators use the term "nation-building" interchangeably with "state-building" (eg Rand report on America's role in nation-buiding).

In a nation-building operation outside states invest much of their resources in establishing and maintaining the host country’s police, military forces, and justice system. Strengthening all these elements is crucial for achieving sustainable law and order. Moreover, successful efforts depend on credible commitment. The process of reconfiguring and resuscitating the political, economic, and social fundamentals of a devastated nation succeeds only when that endeavour is widely perceived to be legitimate. Participation must be the key to such a merger, and to effective partnership. The newcomers must utilize one or more of several possible channels to hear the voice and the concerns of the local population. Only if the peoples of the newly freed country appreciate that their needs are being articulated will outsiders be able to forge working links across the chasm of culture, differing goals, and diverse methods. Only by using old forms of consultation or building new platforms for meaningful discussion will foreigners persuade the local interest groups that their views will be heard, their needs evaluated, and their places and prerogatives in a post-reconstruction society arranged fairly.



## Key concepts

**Complex Emergency:** a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is absolute or significant breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency.

**Conflict Prevention:** diplomatic, military and development activity intended to prevent disputes from arising between parties and existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. **Development:** long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving socio-economic goals, e.g. reducing poverty.

**Emergency Relief:** action to provide immediate assistance to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term humanitarian assistance in the form of water, sanitation, food, medicines and shelter.

**Peace-building:** action to identify and sustain measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**Peace Enforcement:** action, mandated by the United Nations (UN) Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid personnel, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally delivered resolutions or agreements.

**Peacekeeping:** a field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of cease-fires, separation of forces or other peace agreements.

**Peacemaking:** the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties involved/ concerned to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.



**Reconstruction:** the long term process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict.

**Recovery:** action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development, thus ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter.

**Rehabilitation:** action aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods. It overlaps with emergency relief and is typically employed within the first two years after the conflict has ended.

**Transition:** the period following the signing of a peace agreement signalling the transition from an appointed interim government before democratic elections take place.

## **2. THE SITUATION IN IRAQ**

The invasion in Iraq by a multinational force was officially launched on March 20, 2003. U.S. President George W. Bush stated that the objective of the invasion was "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people". More than 40 countries supported the invasion, which together with Kurds from northern Iraq formulated a coalition force. Protesters and anti-war activists staged demonstrations all around the world, including the United States. The 2003 Iraq invasion began the Iraq War.

### **Prelude to the Invasion**

Prior to the invasion, the United States' official position was that Iraq was acting in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 with regards to weapons of mass destruction and had to be



disarmed by force. The United Kingdom and United States attempted to get a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention/ the use of military force, but withdrew it before it could be submitted to a vote after France, Russia, and later China signaled that they would use their Security Council veto power against any resolution that would include an ultimatum allowing the use of force against Iraq. On March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq began.

The Iraqi military was defeated, and Baghdad fell under the coalition forces control on April 9, 2003 at 11:16 a.m. On May 1, 2003, U.S. President Bush declared the end of major combat operations, terminating the Baath Party's rule and to that extend removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from office. Coalition forces ultimately captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003.

## **The UN Security Council and the Iraq war**

On March 2003 the US government announced that "diplomacy has failed" and that it would proceed with a "coalition of the willing" to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. The 2003 Iraq war officially started a few days later.

Prior to this decision, there had been a good deal of diplomacy and debate amongst the members of the UN Security Council over how to deal with Iraq. This article examines the positions of these states as they changed over the period 2002-2003. Prior to 2002, the UN Security Council had passed sixteen resolutions on Iraq. In 2002, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 on Iraq unanimously. In 2003, the US, UK, and Spanish governments proposed another resolution on Iraq, the so called "eighteenth resolution", while others called it the "second resolution". This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn because not enough countries would have supported it, making it a political mistake for its sponsors.

On September 16, 2004 the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, delivering a speech on the invasion, declared that, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."



## Analysis

According to Britain, a majority of the U.N. Security Council members supported its proposed 18th resolution which gave Iraq a deadline to comply with previous resolutions, until France announced that they would veto any resolution that gave Iraq a new deadline. However, for a resolution to pass a supermajority of 9 out of 15 votes is required. Only four countries announced they would support a resolution backing up the war.

In the mid 1990s, France, Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council asked for sanctions on Iraq to be lifted. The sanctions were criticized for making the people suffer and being the cause of a humanitarian disaster. While the sanctions caused hardship within Iraq, the neutrality of France and Russia is questionable following the revelations from the Oil For Food scandal.

Many people also felt that many of the governments that had aligned themselves with the US, despite strong opposition among their constituencies, did so because of their own economic ties to the United States. The United States used strong pressure, coercion and threats against other nations to obtain their support for the Security Council. For example, Mexican diplomats complained that talks with American officials had been rather "hostile in tone", while not taking into account the Mexican government's need to accommodate the overwhelmingly antiwar sentiment of its people. One Mexican diplomat reported that the US told them that "any country that doesn't go along with us will be paying a very heavy price."

The Institute for Policy Studies published a report analyzing what it called the "arm-twisting offensive" by the United States government to get nations to support it. Although President Bush described nations supporting him as the "coalition of the willing", the report concluded what was more accurately described as a "coalition of the coerced." According to the report, most nations supporting Bush "were recruited through coercion, bullying, and bribery." The USA made use of a variety of techniques to pursue other nations support for the war, including but not limited to:

- Promises of aid and loan guarantees to nations who support the U.S.
- Promises of military assistance to nations who support the U.S.



- Threats to veto NATO membership applications for countries who don't abide by the U.S. demands
- Leveraging the size of the U.S. export market and the U.S. influence over financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
- Deciding which countries receive trade benefits under such laws as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). A major condition for approving and providing such benefits, requires that the country does "not engage in activities that undermine United States national security interests".
- Deciding from which countries should the US buy oil in an effort to stock their strategic reserves. To that extend the U.S. exerted such pressures on several oil-exporting nations, such as Mexico.

## **Security, looting and war damage**

Looting took place in the days following the 2003 invasion. Similar looting occurred for two weeks following the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. In that respect the U.S. military should have been aware and was, based on the Panama experience that careful steps should be taken in order to maintain order in post-invasion Iraq. Yet the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld intended to prove that Iraq could be taken with 'force lite', to prove incorrect his interpretation of the 'Powell Doctrine.'" [Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Colin Powell's doctrine, learned from Vietnam, was, don't get into something unless you know how to get out also]. Rumsfeld thus disregarded military recommendations for more troops, at times resulting in few or no invasion reserves, and indeed Rumsfeld did not fire Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shensiki, but Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, publicly questioned the genera's advice for 'several hundred thousand' troops. Looting in Iraq was further left uncontrolled by the decision of (American viceroy) Paul Bremer to de-Baathify Iraq's own military rather than to use that military to maintain order. (But Bremer writes in his book that there was no military to disband; Peter Galbraith wrote in 'AThe Mess,' NY Review of Books, March 9, 2006, that he also found no active Iraqi military, but wrote also that Bremer 'had never been there, did not speak Arabic, had no experience dealing with a



country emerging from war, and had never been involved with nation-building,") It was reported that the National Museum of Iraq was among the looted sites. The assertion that U.S. forces did not guard the museum because they were guarding the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Interior is apparently true. According to U.S. officials the "reality of the situation on the ground" was that hospitals, water plants, and ministries bearing vital intelligence, called for higher security measures than others. Since there were not enough U.S. troops on the ground to guard all the places that ideally needed protection, some "hard choices" had to be made.

In addition to account for the severity of the situation, it was reported that Iraqi gold and \$1.6 billion of bricks of U.S. cash were seized by U.S. forces. The FBI was soon called into Iraq to track down the stolen items. It was found that the initial claims of looting of substantial portions of the collection were heavily exaggerated. Initial reports claimed a near-total looting of the museum, estimated at upwards of 170,000 pieces. The most recent estimate places the number of looted pieces at around 15,000. Over 5,000 looted items have since been recovered.

There has been speculation that some objects still missing were not taken by looters after the war, but were taken by Saddam Hussein or his entourage before or during the fighting. There have also been reports that early looters had keys to vaults that held rarer pieces, and some have speculated as to the pre-meditated systematic removal of key artifacts.

The National Museum of Iraq was only one of many museums and sites of cultural significance that were affected by the war. Many of the arts and antiquities communities briefed policy makers in advance of the need to secure Iraqi museums. Despite the looting being lighter than initially feared, the cultural loss of items from ancient Sumer is significant.

More serious for the post-war state of Iraq was the looting of cached weaponry and ordnance which fueled the subsequent insurgency. As many as 250,000 tons of explosives were unaccounted for by October 2004. Disputes within the US Defense Department led to delays in the post-invasion assessment and protection of Iraqi nuclear facilities. Tuwaitha, the Iraqi site most scrutinized by UN inspectors since 1991, was left unguarded and may have been looted.

Zainab Bahrani, professor of Ancient Near Eastern Art History and Archaeology at Columbia University, reported that a helicopter landing pad was constructed in the very heart of the ancient city of Babylon, and "removed layers of archeological earth from the site". The daily flights of the



helicopters rattled the ancient walls and the winds created by their rotors, blasted sand against the fragile bricks. To quote Zainab Bahrani, "when my colleague at the site, Maryam Moussa, and I asked military personnel in charge that the helipad be shut down, the response was that it had to remain open for security reasons, for the safety of the troops."

Bahrani also reported that in the summer of 2004, "the wall of the Temple of Nabu and the roof of the Temple of Ninmah, both sixth century BC, collapsed as a result of the movement of helicopters". As reported by Bahrani, electrical power is scarce in post-war Iraq, and some fragile artifacts, including the Ottoman Archive, required refrigeration to be preserved.

## **"End of major combat operations" (May 2003)**

On 1 May 2003, Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln*, in a Lockheed S-3 Viking, to announce the end of major combat operations in the Iraq war. Bush's landing was criticized by opponents as an overly theatrical and expensive stunt. The ship was returning home off the coast of southern California near the San Diego harbor. Clearly visible in the background was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished." The banner, made by White House staff and supplied on the request of the U.S. Navy, was criticized as a premature act - especially later as the guerrilla war dragged on. The White House subsequently released a statement that the sign and Bush's visit referred to the initial invasion of Iraq and disputing the claim of theatrics. The speech itself noted: "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We are bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous."

The end of "major combat" though did not mean that peace had settled in Iraq. Iraq was subsequently marked by violent conflict between U.S.-led soldiers and forces described by the occupiers as insurgents. The ongoing resistance in Iraq was concentrated in but not limited to an area referred to, by Western media and the occupying forces, as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad. Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions.

This resistance may be described as guerrilla warfare. The tactics in use were to include mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, improvised explosive devices (IED's),



and handheld antitank grenade-launchers (RPG's), as well as sabotage against the oil infrastructure. There were also accusations, questionable though, about attacks toward the power and water infrastructure.

There is evidence that some of the resistance was organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters. Additionally, as noted above, some if not most of the violence immediately following the end of "major combat operations", was due to internal conflicts between groups within Iraq, including but not limited to violence between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims over long-standing cultural differences.

### 3. ISRAEL LEBANON CONFLICT

The 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War, was a military conflict between Lebanon and northern Israel. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The conflict started on 12 July 2006 and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire came into effect on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted their naval blockade of Lebanon.

The conflict began when Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets and mortars at Israeli military positions and border villages, diverting attention from another Hezbollah unit that crossed the border, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and killing three others. Israeli troops attempted to rescue the abducted soldiers but were unsuccessful, losing five more in the attempt. Another five soldiers and five civilians were wounded in the attacks. Israel responded with massive air strikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon, which damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure, including Rafik Hariri International Airport which Israel said Hezbollah used to import weapons, an air and naval blockade, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions.



On 11 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, called for disarmament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army began deploying in southern Lebanon on 17 August 2006. The blockade was lifted on 8 September 2006. On 1 October 2006, most Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon, though the last of the troops continued to occupy the border-straddling village of Ghajar until 3 December 2006. In the time since the enactment of UNSCR 1701 both the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have stated that they will not disarm Hezbollah.

## **Current situation**

Lebanon's current situation is highly fragile, given the opposition to the standing government which recently spiked in an uprising reminiscent of the Cedar Revolution and the events that precipitated the 1975-1990 civil war. Hezbollah, a guerrilla group that gained increasing political clout after its summer war with Israel and that is currently the most powerful militia in Lebanon, the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and the Amal Movement joined forces, demanding more seats in the government. They claimed that this was necessary in order to establish a "national unity government", while others viewed it was an attempt to gain veto power over all government actions. The opposition group claimed that the current distribution of seats in both the Parliament and the Cabinet did not reflect the true will of the Lebanese people, demanding the immediate resignation of the current government as well as early elections. After the majority government coalition refused, and two weeks before a vote on the creation of an international tribunal to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, five Shiite Ministers from Hezbollah and Amal resigned, along with one Christian Minister from the Free Patriotic Movement. One week later, Lebanon's Minister of Industry Pierre Amine Gemayel, was assassinated by gunmen in the outskirts of Beirut. This created a political crisis because if nine or more ministers left the Cabinet or died, the government would automatically fall. On November 27, 2006, the Cabinet passed the draft



accord supporting the creation of an international tribunal to investigate Hariri's assassination, without the Ministers from the opposition group.

On December 1, 2006, a day after Hassan Nasrallah in a televised address had called on people from "different regions, thoughts, beliefs, religions, ideologies and different traditions" to take part in the 2006 Lebanese Anti-Government Protest, an estimated 800,000 demonstrators amassed peacefully in downtown Beirut. By nighttime, several thousand protestors remained to begin a sit-in, setting up tents and vowing to not leave until Prime Minister Fouad Siniora resigns. Sporadic, violent clashes between pro-government and anti-government groups have flared up, stoking the fears of a possible civil war, leaving one man dead and 21 injured. Nonetheless, the daily protests and nightly sit-ins continue.

On December 7, 2006, Le Monde reported that a top UN official has been informed by Abbas Zaki, the Palestinian Liberation Organization representative in Lebanon, of an assassination plot, by Fatah Al-Islam, a group of 50 al-Qaeda jihadist militants from Iraq, who entered Lebanon via Syria, to assassinate 36 anti-Syrian figures in Lebanon. The group set up operations in the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Also on December 7, 2006, Hassan Nasrallah issued another televised speech calling for further protests, and demanded that the death of Ahmad Mahmoud should not serve as an excuse for any violent clashes. He also made a solemn oath that Lebanon's Shiites would not be "dragged" into a sectarian war with Sunnis.

On December 8, 2006, Israel warned the U.N. force in South Lebanon that al-Qaeda was planning a terrorist attack against international peacekeepers. On December 9, 2006, Lebanon's pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud rejected the proposal which was passed without the approval of representatives from the opposition group on November 27, 2006 blocking the creation of the international tribunal to investigate Hariri's assassination, therefore citing the Cabinet as unconstitutional. The Cabinet was expected to seek parliamentary approval for the tribunal without the President's signature; however Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the Parliament and leader of the pro-Syrian opposition group Amal, probably will not convene to the Parliament for a vote, citing similar unconstitutionality grounds. With regards to that, Berri supposedly received a death threat from Maher al-Assad, the younger brother of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, if he convened to the Parliament for a vote on the accord.



On December 10, 2006, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah accepted in principle an Arab League plan to stabilize the Lebanese political crisis. According to the plan, the number of ministers in the Lebanese government will grow to 30. Two thirds of them will represent the parliamentary majority and one third will be from the opposition. The plan also gave the new government power to establish a new international court for the investigation of the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said "We don't want Lebanon to be an arena of the wars of others. Lebanon is a nation, not an arena," in a veiled reference to Hezbollah's backers in Syria and Iran.

## **Recent events**

On 23 January 2007 the opposition protesters paralyzed Lebanon in massive demonstrations leaving three people from both sides dead, and more than 100 injured. On 25 January 2007 the Hezbollah-led opposition called off its general strike. The uneasy calm underscores who has a say on Lebanon's fate. More than \$7.6 billion in grants and loans were pledged at the Paris 3 conference to help Lebanon recover from the summer war and its \$40 billion debt, including \$1.1 billion pledged by Saudi Arabia, \$770 million pledged by the United States, and \$700 million pledged by each the Arab Monetary Fund and World Bank. But amid the promises of economic reform, Beirut witnessed one of the darkest episodes of sectarian violence in its recent history, as arguments amongst the students of the Beirut Arab University erupted into aggressive fighting that left four dead and 150 injured. Later in the afternoon, the offices of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, situated near the fighting zone, were burned. In response to the escalating violence, the Lebanese army imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Beirut after having mobilized its troops throughout the city. Snipers, shootings, sectarian attacks and roadblocks combined with violence which killed seven and wounded close to 400 have revived civil war memories for Lebanese. Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, whose leaders have been at political odds for months, fought with sticks and stones in the capital. Gunmen picked off targets from surrounding buildings. Four were killed.



On 27 January 2007 Hezbollah founder Sheikh Subhi Tufaili accused Iran of stirring trouble between Shiites and Sunnis. On 29 January 2007 the U.S. condemned Syria, Iran and Hezbollah for trying to destabilize Lebanon, and called for "those responsible for creating chaos" to be "called to account". The U.S. may also take action against Israel for its illegal use of US-made cluster bombs against Lebanese towns and villages from which Hezbollah fighters fired rockets.

On February 8, 2007, the U.S. delivered 60 new vehicles to Lebanon's security forces as part of effort to support the government of the country's fight against Hezbollah, the State Department said. Lebanese authorities seized a truck carrying weapons in the outskirts of Beirut. Hezbollah has demanded the return of the lorry and the arms.

On 13 February 2007 there were explosions at 09:30 (local time) in two minibuses full of passengers. Initial reports announced 12 people dead and another 20 injured in Ain Alaq, south of Bickfaya. The death toll was initially reported as much higher, but the Lebanese Red Cross said its workers had only delivered three bodies to hospitals. Two Lebanese, Laurice Gemayel and Michel Attar, as well as an Egyptian laborer were killed. A mass rally was planned for (February 14) in downtown Beirut to mark the second anniversary of the killing of Rafik Hariri.

On 14 February 2007 hundreds of thousands of defiant Lebanese gathered peacefully in Martyr's Square to commemorate the second anniversary of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. The large number proved that the Cedar Revolution was still going on, especially when the crowds turned the commemoration into a defiant opportunity to blame Syria and Hezbollah for Lebanon's political woes. The demonstrators fell silent at exactly 12:55 PM, the time of the explosion that killed Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005. Only the muezzin making the Islamic call to prayer and the solemn tolling of church bells could be heard, a refreshing reaffirmation of the coexistence that can be possible in Lebanon.

On February 20, 2007, Lebanon's Cabinet passed a resolution to ask for a one-year extension of the ongoing inquiry into the killing of Rafik al-Hariri. On February 28, 2007, nearly six months after feverish search by U.S. and European intelligence agencies for lethal "liquid explosives" Lebanese police confiscated the first batch of such deadly weapons.

From March 1, 2007 and on Hezbollah is building a new line of defense in southern Lebanon. U.S. assures Saniora of support. Lebanon is experiencing a surge in brain drain. Lebanon police



releases sketch of suspect in Gemayel murder. On March 2, 2007, Beirut economic crisis looms as 80 shops close. Merchants and owners of shops, restaurants, and businesses in downtown Beirut see their existence in peril after a three-month political confrontation that has paralyzed the city center, showing no sign of abating. Hundreds of Sunni Muslim jihadists have reportedly turned up in southern Lebanon and are concentrated around the city of Tyre, living in a Palestinian refugee camp.

On March 4, 2007, hundreds of Lebanese peace activists demonstrated in Beirut against perceived threats of civil war to tell politicians "...that they are irresponsible and that the Lebanese people will not be dragged into a new civil war." Iran supported Riyadh's efforts to resolve the political crisis in Lebanon and agreed with the Saudis to diffuse Sunni-Shiite strife.

On March 6, 2007, after 3 months of sit-ins, labor strikes and deadly street clashes, and at the insistence of Saudi Arabia, the political crisis that sparked the worst unrest in Lebanon since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war moved steadily towards resolution. On March 13, 2007, six captured members of Fatah al-Islam, a Palestinian group based in Syria and linked to al-Qaeda, confessed the February 13, 2007 bombings of two buses in Ain Alaq, which killed three people and injured 18 others. Some of those arrested held Syrian or Saudi nationalities, and some were Palestinians from the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus. Based in the Nahr al-Bared and Bedawi Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Fatah al-Islam was a break off group from Fatah al-Intifada, part of the "Syrian intelligence-security apparatus" according to Lebanon's interior minister Hassan Sabe. Fatah al-Islam denied any involvement in the bus bombings.

#### **4. AFRICA**

The past two decades have seen violent conflicts taking an increasing toll on the hopes for Africa's development. Almost half of all African countries, and over one in three African people, are affected directly or indirectly by conflicts. Unless major progress is made to address conflict Africa is unlikely to reach the International Development Goals by 2015. The downward spiral can indeed be reversed. Countries like Mali and Mozambique demonstrate that, with political will and



strong international support, internal conflicts can be resolved and peace restored.

The efforts to integrate lives and livelihoods in societies emerging from civil wars into relative peace are necessary in order to prevent recidivism into violent conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction facilitates the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased, and supports socio-economic development. The process goes beyond the capacity of governments alone. It lies within the establishment of partnerships between the private sector and civil society so as to create the foundations that could serve to support the transition. By its very nature, post conflict reconstruction measures, demand concerted efforts from all parties concerned to ensure that the process evolves and ends with success. Therefore, it is essential to engage all stakeholders in the reconstruction process. When stakeholders do not have a stake in making adjustments, reforming political, economic and social relationships, then the process is likely to fail and recidivist pressures can cause the conflict to recur. Over and above this, other stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society can complement the weak capacity of a "conflict-weary" state by means of their unique comparative advantages. A combined partnership of the government, the private sector and the civil society, would be the finest for a successful post-conflict reconstruction.

Although government efforts are critical in addressing post-conflict reconstruction, they are not efficient in dealing with all kinds of challenges posed. The last requires the mobilization of all talents and resources that stakeholders have underscoring to that extend the need for partnerships between the government, the private sector and the civil society. Experience has indicated that ownership and responsibility for reconstruction must reside within the Africa civil society itself to be successful. Civil society and governments can play complementary roles. Similarly, the private sector has a role in post-conflict reconstruction in an era where the sector is increasingly conceived of as the "engine of growth". Therefore, areas of complementarities between the entities should be sought. Action is necessary to catalyze the inclusion of societal groups in discussion and negotiation processes apt to all aspects of reconstruction.

The African union has just adopted drastic measures in creating mechanisms and authorities responsible for conflict prevention and resolution within the renewed spirit of NEPAD that allows more space for citizens' participation.



## **The Post-conflict Situation - What are the Issues and Challenges?**

The inclination of African conflicts to recur has drawn our attention to the multiple challenges posed by post conflict management and reconstruction. Further, the end of conflict does not necessarily mean the end of problems. The transition process from war to peace entails not only overcoming structural causes that originally sparked the fighting, but also effectively mitigating ongoing conflict and dealing with the legacies of conflict, which define the challenges of the post conflict situation which are numerous. The process is much more than just repairing infrastructure. When civil authority has broken down, the first priority is to restore people's sense of security. This includes restoring legitimate government institutions that are regarded by citizens as serving all groups and that are able to allay persistent tensions, while carrying out the challenging and costly task of rebuilding. Guaranteeing the security for every individual and respect of fundamental human rights are therefore, the cornerstones of political and economic stabilization. Attaining the last requires the rebuilding of credible institutions at central as well as local and community levels, since these will have a determining influence on the entire reconstruction efforts, ranging from the restoration of productive sectors of the economy and the return of capital, to disarmament. As a result the major challenge for post-conflict reconstruction would be the efforts to legitimize state institutions. In a general sense, political institutions must be seen as legitimate and competent. One way of establishing such legitimacy is through legitimate elections though, the last alone cannot create nor sustain democracy. In a broader sense, democratization must be conceived as a context of restructuring the relationship within the government and the civil society and also as an arena for partnership and dialogue between all parties concerned. This entails developing the relevant operative governance structures, including rule of law and other civil society institutions.

In addition to the institutional challenges noted above, there are other challenges indicative of the range of needs that must be addressed early in societies emerging from conflict if the ground is to be secured for sustainable peace and economic development. These include:

- Rebuilding infrastructure, including water, sanitation, shelter and transportation;



- food security and agricultural rehabilitation, including land tenure designation and registration;
- urgent health, education and basic social welfare requirements, including employment and income generation; and
- demobilization and reintegration, which takes priority in the peace process because security must be enhanced; the rule of law promoted; development stimulated; refugees repatriated.

A major challenge of post-conflict is that presented by a polarized society, which has tendency to continue to weaken all kinds of social relations. This situation may endure because of conditions of insecurity. Rebuilding bridges of communication between social groups and promoting political participation are therefore necessary but daunting challenges for social reconstruction. In this context, post-conflict reconstruction policy shall deliberately foster the re-emergence of civil society.

Another, important issue posing significant challenges to post-conflict reconstruction is that of food security and social provisions. Typically, war debilitates the productive capacity of a country and displaces most of the agriculturally productive segment of the population. The result is usually extensive hunger and malnutrition. Hence, improving food security is basic to any systematic post-conflict reconstruction. This includes efforts to improve agricultural productivity, access to markets and market-based measures to stabilize farm-gate prices. Also, given that most social services would have either deteriorated or even been abandoned entirely, there is the added challenge to restore basic services in health, education, water supply and increased life opportunities for women, disabled, youth and the rural population.

An overarching theme underlying the above challenges is a focus on the special needs of women, children and the elderly, as these vulnerable groups invariably comprise of a substantial majority of the affected population. The challenge here is on how to integrate the needs of these groups in the entire reconstruction process. For reintegration to succeed, recovery efforts must include the entire community, with regard to the rights of all. The special role of women as agents of change should be promoted in all reconstruction and economic development activities.



## **Post Conflict transition: Partnership and Roles of Stakeholders**

As indicated in earlier sections of the current paper, and conceived in the context of the challenges outlined above, the process of achieving and sustaining long-term peace in a country emerging from conflict is not an easy run. It is certainly beyond the capacity of any single entity, and definitely beyond that of war-torn governments, since they themselves are often parties to the conflict. It requires launching a process of good governance, the very absence of which, in large part, caused violent conflict in the first instance. Post-conflict efforts also must include preparing for the reconstruction itself. It is a critical part of the broader process of re-building a shattered country and institutions. The process of reconstruction requires first and foremost knowledge and information. It also requires political leadership and cooperation and it requires funding. Yet, above all, it entails a process that must provide opportunity to continue to listen to citizens who must be in the driver's seat for reconstruction. All these require a concerted effort from the government, private sector and civil society.

The foregoing also implies a broad partnership, which is critically important because the magnitude and diversity of the problems are beyond the capacity of any single institution to address. And, each stakeholder has a specific comparative advantage that it can contribute. Government must embark on a deliberate crafting and introduction of the elements of good governance into the social and political system. Private sector spirit and capacity must be at the centre of development strategy, and evident in reconstruction efforts from the beginning, including the delivery of both infrastructure and social services. And reconstruction must also be targeted on building a nation together with the inputs of a strong civil society and communities, good governance, transparency and open and positive relations between local communities and government. A coordinated and holistic approach must be taken, from the point of view of the people and their community, in all sectors ranging from road building, agriculture and rural development, as well as health, education and water and sanitation.

The point to be made here is that, partnership between the state, private sector and civil society is a sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction with the government taking the lead. This partnership must be predicated on identifying and recognizing the developmental challenges of the



post-conflict situation, sorting out comparative advantages and synergizing, staking out mutual responsibilities and accountabilities, and geared exclusively to complementing government effort. Greater attention need to be paid especially, on the complementary role of civil society, whose grassroots processes can be harnessed for effective reconstruction efforts. This means that success in reconstruction is based on the direct participation in, and ownership of, the reconstruction effort by the country's communities at all levels and also by the broad and coordinated participation of key NGOs.

## **The Role of Civil Society**

In the wake of many conflicts in Africa, however, effective national governments do not exist, placing greater burden and responsibility on civil society efforts. In some countries, civil society itself has been decimated by conflict. In these situations, rebuilding may begin with the reconstitution and re-organization of civil society itself. Nevertheless, civil society has a most important role to play in post-conflict reconstruction and both its leaders and institutions can perform different functions in the process. These include, among other things, channelling and dissemination of information; advocating norms, values, and standards; encouraging power-sharing among competing interest; contributing to good governance; providing the means for interaction and confidence-building across the lines that divide parties in conflict; and encouraging and participating in socio-economic activities aimed at mitigating disparities.

In situations where post-conflict reconstruction is underway, peace efforts must address the underlying causes of the conflict to prevent a recurrence of violence. Because average citizens are the primary targets groups of the peace building process, input provided on their behalf by civil society actors is essential for its success. African CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) can therefore play an important role in providing early warning regarding impending conflicts by concretely derailing the sources and the parameters of disparities, mistrust, suspicions, and misperceptions between adverse groups.

In countries where politics are restricted in national level, civil society can perhaps work towards creating more open and susceptible democratic structures at domestic and regional levels.



Democracies are not created overnight, especially in the context of post-conflict situation. Civil society organizations can be useful in easing the laborious task of building these structures by being more representative of, and sensitive to the needs and wishes of average citizens. By doing so, they will provide the long-term utility dialogue and discussion that is so necessary for post-conflict reconstruction.

Further, CSOs can encourage conflicting parties to engage in a long-term communication process including the launching of parallel, or "track two" efforts at mediation and facilitation. Also, as an important constituency of political leaders, civil society can pressure conflicting parties to seek peaceful settlements. In these various activities, the roles of women, elderly and religious leaders are particularly salient.

One major development challenge for post-conflict transition is the lack of funding for reconstruction. A comparative advantage of African CSOs is their ability to attract external funding for local development purposes. CSOs, through their northern counterparts, can be an important source for funding. Therefore, the effectiveness and ability of civil society in mitigating conflict can be significantly enhanced through an alliance between national and international NGOs. Further, CSOs in countries where conflict has just ended, could play a decisive role within the overall strategic framework embracing political, human rights, humanitarian and political development activities in organizing, mobilizing and influencing bilateral and multilateral development agencies to direct assistance where it is most needed. Some of the substantive areas, which are a purview of the CSOs, could be: facilitating the rapid re-establishment of income earning activities; identification and implementation of quick impact micro-projects; and capacity building activities that can quickly ensure the re-integration of ex-combatants, refugees and displaced persons into their communities.

Finally, in many African countries, existing development strategies have not only failed to benefit the lower classes, but have destroyed forests, arable land, and fragile ecosystems, thus depriving many people of their life support systems, and in turn exacerbating existing conflicts. Given the failure of the existing development practises in Africa, there is an urgent need for NGOs to formulate and promote alternative development strategies that are friendly towards both entrepreneurs and the environment, and deep rooted in African realities and traditions. In this



regard, NGO advocacy serves to signal the shift to more people-centred approaches and the importance of development in post-conflict situations.

## **The Role of Government**

In light of the enormous developmental challenges of post-conflict areas, the government must necessarily take the lead in crafting a post-conflict reconstruction plan. While partnership with civil society and the private sector is crucial in reconstruction, it is the state that should provide the broad framework within which all actors must operate and define the general developmental thrusts of the country. In crafting the reconstruction plan therefore, a government must recognize the many issues, which sparked conflicts in the first place and the problems it will have to deal with after the conflict to prevent its recurrence and initiate recovery. Among its top priorities are issues related with the reconstruction of the economy and the rehabilitation of society. In that respect, the critical elements required for post-conflict reconstruction are a) well-planned economic reforms, mainly organized and secured through good governance; and b) a thriving civil society buttressed by a solid social capital base and augmented through decentralized government.

The primary structural conditions that lead to intra-state crises and violence is a function of the nature and role of the government, hence the state plays a critical part in post-conflict reconstruction. A primary function of the state is to manage the reconstruction process through national authorities or mechanisms, and through provincial and /or local channels and security forces. If the state lacks viable institutional means to protect rights and interests, manage competition and settle disputes and grievances, individuals and groups will resort to violence. Even with the presence of an adequate institutional framework, violence may erupt if the state is too weak to maintain and enforce conflict management systems and if it lacks popular legitimacy. Thus, governments have a responsibility to proactively build peace by establishing a political structure that is transparent, representational, and most importantly, interactive.



## **Government-CSOs partnership**

It is noted from the foregoing that the role of CSOs in post-conflict reconstruction is clear. While this is the case, it is also important to articulate and delineate the specific needs for coordination and partnership between CSOs and other stakeholders, especially government in the re-building process. There is usually mixed feelings on the type and level of interaction that should exist between CSOs and the government. The standard position is that government should only provide a conducive environment and facilitative role to enable CSOs to become effective.

However, the nature of the relationship between civil society and governments depends on the form of government and its openness to civil society. The situation is often characterized by a feeling of mistrust especially where some CSOs are seen to be parties to conflict. In any case, governments have responsibility for creating mechanisms to coordinate reconstruction efforts towards resolving basic political, economic and identity concerns of the post-conflict society. This task however, is often unfulfilled due to lack of resources, the effects of long-term conflict, general lack of state capacity or lack of government credibility or will to play its role (particularly in cases where the government itself is involved in a conflict). Although ideally civil society should provide institutions and processes that complement those provided by governments, it plays an especially important role in filling the institutional vacuum in situations where government institutions are particularly weak or non-existent.

Members of African CSOs can also work with government to develop creative options for promoting equitable and sustainable forms of enterprise in the post-conflict setting. Given the tradition of community-based economic and political structures, African private enterprise might better serve Africa if it were organized along cooperative lines, recycling profits back into the communities that provide resources and labor. This could form a classic basis for partnership between government, private sector and civil society.



## **The Role of Private Sector**

In striving to build post-conflict economies, Africans have not explored the resources available with the private sector in Africa, relying on resource provisions from governmental sources, especially external donors. While it may be necessary to rely on such governmental sources, it is equally important to recognize that the private sector could be an important financial support base. This sector could support key elements of the reconstruction plan, particularly within the context of the private sector as the recognized "engine of growth". However, less widely recognized is the vital contribution the private sector makes to economic development infrastructure and 'economic multipliers', which provide the momentum for future development. This includes distribution networks, financing mechanisms, access to markets, training and human resource development etc.

Business can play a role in pursuing sustainable development that constitute investing in local communities, supporting local education and health and enterprise development programs, and funding activities that promote diversity, tolerance and education. These activities help to make local communities less likely to be trapped in underdevelopment and conflict. Further, after the cessation of fighting, business can fund projects that target affected population taking into account long-term development strategies of the country. Collaboration with NGOs may often provide an opportunity to balance commercial and development objectives.

Having outlined the role of business above, one must acknowledge the fact that the private sector cannot perform its determined role in the post-conflict situation unless in the context of an enabling environment conducive to the performance of sound business. Government therefore has a role to embark on an economic reform that provides the right combination of incentives for private sector development. In the same vein, the private sector should consider how it could develop partnership with government and CSOs to optimize their impact on local economic development where this is possible. This sets the framework for partnership between government, private sector and civil society for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The question is that whether such a partnership frame has existed elsewhere that could provide the guide for future work in post-conflict areas in general.



## **Case study on Post Conflict Partnership Practises in Africa: the cases of Mali and Liberia**

### The case of Mali

The Malian case is particularly instructive because it provides an inter temporal context within which to establish the significance of civil society partnership in reconstruction. Following years of unrest and violent conflict in the northern part of Mali, peace finally prevailed in 1996 in the solemn "Peace of Flame" ceremony. The role of civil society as a partner to government in the Malian reconstruction process is worth discussing here. There were two major-armed conflicts in Mali involving the government and the Tuaregs in the North between 1962 and 1964 and from 1990 to 1995. Each time, the government attempted and failed to resolve the situation using military means. Neither civil society nor business was deemed relevant to peace building and this may have collaborated with other factors to undermine the success of several peace accords that were signed before 1996. These accords failed woefully to prevent a resurgence of violence.

However, when civil society was finally brought in the fray peace prevailed. This was the culmination of several years of extensive consultations with civil society across the country starting in 1991 (National Conference and the Mopti Conference). And, it also showed that civil society must and can be involved in seeking solutions to major national problems. A lasting solution has now been found and the efforts of civil society have largely contributed towards consolidating governmental action aimed at the construction of peace.

A key component of the reconstruction process in Mali has been the pursuit of good governance and the mobilization for sustainable development. The regions of the north have attracted the attention of the authorities not only in the framework of good governance but also and most especially in the area of sustainable human development.

### The case of Liberia

In 1989, Liberia had its first wave of armed insurrection by rebel forces. Thereafter, the country plunged into seven years of intense factional fighting, which ended in 1996 albeit, still characterized by intermittent outburst in fighting. Before that attempts to restore peace and stability continued at all fronts - local, subregional, regional and international. At the local level, the role of CSOs in the



process including administering of relief and brokering peace is well acknowledged.<sup>19</sup> Civil Society organizations alongside their subregional, regional and international partners influenced the peace debates, with a focus on how to bring lasting peace to Liberia. Indeed, citizen's groups strongly propelled and supported efforts to end the war and institute an elected government.

The level of devastation brought on by the conflict in Liberia was great and required enormous effort for rebuilding. The prolonged conflict reduced significantly agricultural and industrial productivity, causing an appreciable drop in the country's ability to accumulate foreign exchange. Further, the country's roads and telecommunications infrastructure was affected. As a result, the challenge for reconstruction was beyond the capacity of the state alone. In this instance, NGOs contributed and redirected their energies from peace brokering into post-conflict activities, which included conflict management, peace building through community development, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The range of activities carried out by CSOs included micro-projects to help rehabilitate, repatriate, reconstruct and rebuild. Their actions also covered activities to promote democracy and economic stability. Many of the CSOs were also involved in local initiatives to help maintain and promote peace and this included helping war affected children, rehabilitation of traumatized child-soldier, community development and income generation activities.



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<http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/07.21.html>

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## Africa

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<http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/SS1.pdf>

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<http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp30.pdf>

<https://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/02/17/50/POSTCONFLICTSOCIETIESINAFRICA.doc>

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